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FOREWORD	 V
i
3
The "Study to Determine Extravehicular Mobility, Unit 	 {
(EMU) Advanced Technology Requirements' was conducted for
the Ames Research Center by Space Division of Rockwell
International Corporation under contract NAS2-8957.	 The	 j
contract Technical Monitor for Ames was P. D. Quattrone,
Chief of the Environmental Control Research Branch.
P. D. Quattrone was assisted by H. C. Vykukal and
B. W. Webbon of the same branch. 	 Cooperation and assistance
_ were also given by personnel at Goddard Space Flight Center,
Langley Research Center, and Marshall Space Flight Center.
The final report consists of two volumes, as follows:
. 3
Volume I	 Executive Summary
is
k j Volume II	 Technical Analysis	 3
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SECTION I. -INTRODUCTION
The final report of the "Study to Determine Extravehicular Mobility Unit 1
(EMU) Advanced Technology Requirements" was conducted to establish the role pay- I
loads play in design and operation of the EMU. 	 This volume of the final report
presents detailed information on the work performed in the study,,_ including
analyses of requirements that might be derived from payload design and operations
characteristics, or from various EVA tasks.
	 This section summarizes background
to the study and study approaches.
1.1	 STUDY OBJECTIVES
_r
This study was planned in order to utilize previous study payloads analyses
and on-going payload studies to derive EMU requirements in addition to previous
physiologically and environmentally derived requirements; of particular importance
in the study are requirements which might require technology advances.
	 The stated
objectives of the study are:
Identify ExtravehicuZar Mobility Unit TechnoZogy Advances Responsive
to PayZoad EVA AppZications
EnZist Active Participation of PayZoad Community in Substantiating
EVA Applications for PayZoad Operations
1.2	 STUDY APPROACH
The EMU study was divided into two phases.	 Phase I was planned to allow
for review of previous study data and to develop and test approaches for the
Phase II effort.- The Phase I review provided an opportunity for additional NASA
direction.'
Phase II of the study required investigation of EVA interfaces and reviews
of payload characteristics with the payload community in several NASA centers.'
These reviews included efforts to validate concepts of EVA-oriented designs
developed in the previous study. 	 Using these data, design and operations analyses ?
were performed to derive EMU requirements.
	 The following diagram, Figure 1-1,
- illustrates the study approach.
` 1.3
	
BACKGROUND
1.3.1	 Prior Study Activity
l
The study activities presented in this report were based on a contract pre-
viously conducted under the direction of Ames Resaarch Center, entitled "Study to
! Evaluate the Effect of EVA on Payloads Systems".1
1Contract  NAS2-8429, Final 'Report, Rockwell International,- SD 75-SA-0028,
November 1975.
^ 1-1
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Figure 1-1.	 Study Approach
Study activity began with four stated objectives.	 Results of the study met
these objectives in the following manner.
1.	 Identify Uses of EVA which Significantly Reduce PayZoad Costs
The study identified 61 potential EVA applications--44 of which were Routine
Operations; i.e., applied at some point in the mission cycle of every payload.
Detailed design and cost data on these applications resulted typically in Net
EVA savings of $75K to $150K for each _such ,manual alternative. 	 Conservatively,
cost savings were only accumulated for 21 out of the total of 44 routine appli-
cations for which technical assurance and credible data could be provided.
2.	 Compare TechnicaZ and Economic Characteristics of Selected
PayZoads--Automated, TeZeoperator, or EVA-Design Oriented
I
Thirteen representative payloads were analyzed in the study. 	 Baseline
(automated) modes of operation were evaluated and compared to EVA modes.	 In all
cases, utilization of EVA resulted in design simplification and lower cots. 	 Net I
savings attributed to 'EVA for DDT&E and first unit costs averaged $2.5 million a
for automated spacecraft and $8.9 million for sortie payloads.
1-2
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3. Determine the Amount of These Savings and Extrapolate to the
NASA PayZoad 14ode2
Cost savings for the 13 representative payload programs were extrapolated to
the total "572 flight" traffic model, whereby costs were estimated for 74 programs
with 249 flight units. Net EVA savings were extrapolated to over $551M for NASA
and U.S civil payloads for routine operations. Adding DOD and ESRO payloads
increases the net estimated savings to $776M.
4. Evaluate and Compare Automated Versus EVA Task Times
Detailed task-time data were applied to the 13 payloads operations to derive
integrated, comparative timelines. With EVA, routine preparation timelines were
decreased in one case by 1.7 elapsed hours to a maximum increase of 1.3 hours
average 0.5 hour increase. EVA durations ranged from 1.5 hours to 6 hours--
average 3.7. These activities require the following:
One-man EVA - 11 payloads
	 One EVA cycle	 - 9 payloads
Two-man EVA	 2 payloads	 Two EVA cycles - 4 payloads
Three EVA cycles 1 payload (on-
orbit maintenance)
Planned maintenance for a projected 13-payload program (out of a possible
51-payload programs) indicated an estimated $168M savings due to elimination of
automated servicingequipment. If all spacecraft designated "Reusable" (28
	 ??
programs) are included, the potentially extrapolated cost savings of the EVA
mode would be ti $316M.
EVA savings for contingencyproblems of payloads were based on transport
and equipment costs due to payload failures. Historical anomaly and failure
data were extrapolated to the Shuttle payload model. To the extent that EVA
can be applied successfully in preventing or resolving failures, reflight or
jettison losses, savings up to $1.9 billion could be realized. Table 1 -1'
summarizes the study EVA cost savings estimates.
Table 1-1. "EVA" Study Program Cost Savings Summary
PAYLOAD MISSION ACTIVITY Totals ($M)
ROUTINE OPERATIONS
Automated Spacecraft 358
Sortie Payload 418
776
'PLANNED MAINTENANCE
Automated Spacecraft - LEO 168
Automated Spacecraft -'HEO	 No EVA Benefit
168`
CONTINGENCY APPLICATIONS
Automated Spacecraft 1300
Sortie Payload 57-0
1870 ---- _
1-3
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1.3.2 Historical_ EVA Approaches
Space crew pressure garments were originally developed as a backup crew
protective device, but were also seen as a developmental element for the p;,,sonal -
protective and life support system required for projected space and lunar oparations.
The Project Gemini "space walks" were experimental and were performed with
a life support umbilical and a protective suit now considered extremely crude
and awkward. The Apollo suits requiring a portable life support system went
through several development phases before evolving into the sophisticated design
which essentially served for lunar excursions, scientific instrument module
activities, and the Skylab program.
1
Pressure suits and life support systems in the past have primarily been
developed around physiological and human engineering requirements In addition,
they were primarily planned for the specific activity of Apollo lunar exploration
and adapted to Skylab for ATM film retrieval. However, with the Shuttle, and its
variety of payloads, a broad range of EVA tasks and activities are potential
EMU design drivers. Table ,1-2 compares the relative magnitude of the Shuttle
program to previous manned space flight.
Table 1-2. U.S. Manned Spaceflight Data
MERCURY GEMINI APOLLO SKYLAB ASTP SHUTTLE
TOTAL 54 1940 7506 12,351 652 557,000
MAN-HOURS
EVA
-- 12 168 82 -- 15,560
MAN-HOURS
NUMBER .6 10 it 3 1 572
FLIGHTS
CREW 1 2 3 3 3 ,,, 4
SIZE
R
!
	
	 The Shuttle EVA manhours are predicted from the EVA study. If the total
Apollo and Skylab manhours-to-EVA manhours were'ratioed to Shuttle total man-
hours, the results would be 12,500 Apollo, and 3,700 Skylab EVA manhours. The
	
J
baseline Shuttle provides the equivalent provisions for 20,600 manhours of EVA
for 572 flights--over 13,700 for payloads usage,
t.,	 4
1-4
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The Apollo program EVA hours were driven by the primary mission objectives
of lunar exploration.	 Skylab did not have as high a ratio of EVA man-hours to
total _mission man-hours because of the very long duration crew stay times.	 How-
ever, planned EVA was conducted on "payload" (ATM) type operations as opposed to
the more unique lunar exploration activities of Apollo.	 It is significant that
about 60 percent of SkylabEVA man-hours were conducted for contingency purposes.
Over 15 thousand man-hours of payload-related operations can be predicted from
the "EVA" study. 	 This represents a higher percentage of total EVA man-hours than 	 I
either Apollo^or Skylab, but correlates approximately with Shuttle orbiter-provided
EVA for payloads. Contingency EVA man-hours could increase this total by a factor
of two or three.
1
The significance of these data are that they emphasize the overall import-
-	
ance'of EVA for Shuttle payload operations and, therefore, the importance of
ensuring an efficient and effective EVA capability.
1.4	 SUMMARY OF STUDY RESULTS
!f The study began with two stated primary objectives.	 Results of the studyin relation to these objectives are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Identify EMU TechnoZogy Advances Responsive to Pay load EVA AppZications
1
In examining the interface of EVA crewman-to-payloads, requirements were
seen to fall into three groups
1.	 Crew protection (from EVA task or payload-related hazards)
2.	 Crew performance (related to payloads tasks)
3. 'Payload protection (from EVA-payload tasks)
3
Twenty requirement categories were identified in these three groups.
Requirements for the EMU were then derived in these categories from four primary
j sources:	 payload design characteristics, payload missions and operations, EVA
tasks, and EMU design characteristics. 	 A matrix of these requirement categories
and derivation' sources is shown in Table 1-3.
Each requirement category was evaluatedon the basis of payload definition
i and EVA operations.	 The nature of some types of requirements lend ` themselves
to quantitative conclusions.	 Quantitative data are presented in this report
relative to the following requirement categories:
Thermal - payload temperature
Radiation Exposure - payload source levels and mission EVA exposures
to the Van Allen belt
Penetration and Impact Resistance - payload preferred design approaches 	 }
Force Interfaces - EVA task reaction force estimates
Operating Time - mission/EVA statistical data
ry Contamination -'payload sensitivity
Other evaluations provided subjective results. 	 In other cases, no payload
{ unique requirements were derived.
' 1-5
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DERIVATION SOURCE,
PAYLOAD PAYLOAD EVA EMU
REQUIREMENT CATEGORY DESIGN MISSION TASK OPNS.
I.	 CREW PROTECTION
I. Flammability X
2. Thermal X X X
3. Durability X X X
4. Dielectric properties X
5. Radiation resistance X X X
6 . Penetration, abrasion l
resistance
7. Fluid resistance X
8. Impact resistance X X
9. Bio-contamination K
II.	 CREW PERFORMANCE.
1. Reaction time x
2. Force interfaces x K
3. Mobility X Y
4. Visibility/orientation X
5. Communications X
6. Operating time K
7. Reliability/maintainability X
III.	 PAYLOAD PROTECTION
1. Contamination g ;(
2. EMI/EMC X
3. Dielectric properties X X X
4.	 Surface damage l_ Y
c
f	
1	
^	 ai	 I
i	 r	
3	 i
j
s
s
oi%
Space Division
Rockwell International
i
f	 `
EnZist Active Participation of Pa Zoad Communit, in S lbstant ating
EVA App Zications for Path Zoad Operations
j
In addition to earlier reviews conducted during the "EVA" study, a specific
presentation was planned and conducted to meet this study objective. Meetings
were held with personnel at Space Division who are participating in the follow-
ing payload study contracts:
Payload	 Contract	 Cognizant Center
;r	
LANDSAT"(EOS)	 NAS5-23203 (Basic)	 GSFC
ATL	 NAS1-14116	 LaRC
ASP	 NAS5-23203 (Mod 16) 	 GSFC
q	 f	 The space telescope was also reviewed with investigators responsible for recent
i-	 IR&D and payload integration studies. The review at NASA centers included the
following project areas:
I
s
f, 1-6
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Goddard Space Flight Center
Shuttle Payloads Office_- Multi-Mission Modular Spacecraft (MMS)
Astronomy Spacelab Payloads (ASP)
Langley Research Center
Shuttle Experiments Office - Advanced Technology Laboratory (ATL)
Marshall Space Flight Center
Program Development Preliminary Design
Science and Engineering - Systems Analysis and Integration
The results of these reviews can be summarized as follows:
Planned Use of EVA Offers Attractive Design AZternatives in Cost
Savings, SimpZicity, and Reliability
PayZoad Designers Require Assurance of Reasonable EVA Performance
EVA-to-PayZoad Interfaces Are Not Adequately Understood by PayZoad
Designers and Require Further Study
Lack of Definition of ShuttZe_Provisions (i.e., MuZti-Mission
`
	
	 Equipment) and Pser Charge PoZicies Has ResuZted in Uncertainty
in PayZoad Design
Two general conclusions from these reviews are (1) that the uses and methodology
for EVA are not well understood nor applied, and (2) that there are concerns about
costs and imposed qualification and documentation requirements. Some of the more
-specific potential requirements areas areas follows:
PayZoad edge "sharpness" requirement on EMU
Visibility capabiZ ty over Zower body
GZove dexterity and "fit" in PayZoad designs
Thermal interface on poZished aluminum
i
-I
a	
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SECTION 11. PAYLOAD ANALYSES
In order to ensure concentration of study activities, the representative
payloads to be examined were limited to five, in comparison to 13 payloads
analyzed in the "EVA" study. Analyses conducted were generally limited to
those payloads; however, where pertinent characteristics (e.g., cryo-cooled
sensors, RTG's, etc.) were not found in the representative payload, such data
were added to the study from other payloads. In addition, other results and
data from the "EVA" study were used, including detailed equipment designs,
overall payload definitions and operations data, and mission traffic model data.
2.1 REPRESENTATIVE PAYLOADS AND EVA CONCEPTS
The five representative payloads and their responsible center are:
Payload	 Responsible Center
Atmospheric, Magnetospheric, and Plasmas in Space 	 MSFC/GSFC
(AMPS)
Space Telescope	 MSFC
LANDSAT-D'(EOS)	 GSFC
Astronomy Spacelab Payload (ASP) 	 GSFC
Advanced Technology Laboratory (ATL)	 LaRC
The payloads listed were selected to meet the following criteria:
3
1. At least one payload from the payload centers of MSFC, GSFC,
and LaRC a
2. Payloads studied in the previous EVA, contract or which are the 	 I
subject of currently contracted in-house studies 	 y
3. Payloads which reflect a wide range of candidate EVA tasks
A description of each payload and its typical EVA. applications follows.
2.1.1 Atmospheric, Magnetospheric and Plasmas in Space (AMPS)	 s
i
`	 2.1.1.1 Baseline System
The AMPS payload consists of a variety of active and passive instrumentation
designed to observe and artificially perturb the space environment and upper'
atmosphere. Multipurpose controls, displays, and data processing equipment are
i included to permit effective interaction among on-orbit investigators and
experiments. A typical configuration for the AMPS payload might include: (1)
a sortie lab module, (2) a pallet (with at least three sections), and (3)
scientific equipment. Controls/display units are located in the Spaeelab module,
while all the sensors are pallet mounted.
t 	 2-1
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2.1.1.2 Baseline Payload Operations
The AMPS payload isa complex integration of a variety of sensors and
supporting devices. Consequently, it was felt that the most probable sequence
for deployment would be by generic or grouped sensors. To satisfactorily per-
form the AMPS mission many of the sensors are operated simultaneously to take
advantage of the synergi.stics effect and obtain backup information. Since
most of the sensors operate simultaneously in many of the experiments, it was
felt that no experiment should be started until all items were deployed, checked
out, and activa -d. Preparation for operation has-been analyzed from the view-
point of deploying those most likely to be either hazardous or require some time
to separate/translate from the Shuttle or immediate Shuttle vicinity.
2.1.1.3 AMPS EVA Applications
The major EVA effort is exerted during both the preparation for operation 	 {
and the preparation for entry. Since most of the equipment is so large or
generates large amounts of radiation, the normal mission experiment operations
are conducted from the control and display area. Use of EVA has allowed
simplification of some equipment such as replacing deployable booms with stowed
tubular masts. The major benefit derived from EVA is simplification of Shuttle-
'
	
	
to-payload interfaces. Figure 2-1 illustrates the overall payload and a typical
EVA-to-payload interface.
i
f	 .
I	 '
oa
l v ^00	  
0•
Figure 2-1. AMPS EVA Operations
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The same sequence of equipment deployment is used in the EVA mode as in
the _automated. That is, deployment of the most sensitive/complex units first
(i.e., subsatellites and balloons, then large deployable structures).
Evaluation of tasks and times shows that many of the less complex installa-
tions can be performed simultaneously.- The boom system and the satellite system
art, not compatible for simultaneous deployment. By their very nature the satel-
lites once released are free to move about and not having a total field of view
of both satellite and the deployed antennas, it can become a sensitive situation.
T;1e following provides a scenario of EVA operations
Deployable Units AP600. The EVA crewman performs a visual inspection for
damage, or defects of the balloon canisters and the multi-sized barium canisters.
Following a'successful inspection the packaged balloons are deployed into space.
The balloon deployment mechanism is a simple mechanical device which is'spring-
loaded. It requires only that the astronaut pull a lever,. As the balloon canister
is deployed, a timer attached to the canister sets off the inflating mechanism
at the proper time. Both balloons are deployed within a few minutes of each
other, but are positioned such that they translate away from the Shuttle and
+f	 away from each other.
1	 _
The EVA crew performs a physical inspection of the selected satellite.
Having, found no discrepancies one EVA astronaut provides vernier guidance to
the remote manipulator during manipulator-to-satellite attachment. The other
f
	
	 astronaut translates to the _satellite latching mechanism in preparation for
deployment.,
Upon disengagement of the satellite from its pallet mount, both EVA astro-
nauts help guide the unit and dampen any induced oscillations. The manipulator
is operated from the RMS station temporarily using a Shuttle crewman. The
manipulator is 'then extended such that the satellite is the maximum distance
` from anypoint of the Shuttle and releases the satellite.
^	 1
Boom System - AP500. Each of the two 50-meter booms retain the astromaut
design and the requirement for articulation in two planes, remaining remotely
deployable and maneuverable, but the platforms are prepared by two EVA astro-
naut 	 The astronauts retrieve two matched sections of a 5-m tubular pole,
assemble it via the quick disconnect-type connector, and one of the astronauts 	
9
inserts the assembled unit into its proper operational fitting. This same
sequence is followed assembling a second deployed 5-m experiment boom. All
electrical connections are then made.
	
Next, one astronaut removes the contamination covers from appropriate	 j
instruments and unlatches all mechanisms as required, plus unlatches the gimbal
platform. The other astronaut unlatches the retention mechanism on the Boom A
canister. The 50-m boom is then remotely deployed at a rate of 5 to 6 feet per
minute. Another remotely performed function is activated to drive out two 33
meter dipole antennas mounted on the sides of the experiment platform. At this
time the platform is well clear of any Shuttle appendages and the dipoles can
be freely deployed.
2-3
-	 -	
SD 76LN
	
^-.^	 .
I f	 f
oi% Space DivisionRockwell International
The astronauts translate to Boom B where the contamination-sensitive
sensors (targets and calibration light) have their covers removed and stowed
and the gimbal platform unlatched. 	 In ,conjunction with the above task, one
astronaut begins to unlatch Boom B latching mechanisms. 	 When all latching
mechanisms have been released (Boom B and platform), Boom B is then extended
in the same manner and at the same rate as Boom A. j
Transmitter/Coupler System - AP400. 	 Preparation for operation is identical
<i
to the automated procedure with the exception that the contamination cover is
removed manually and stowed.	 The interface between the antenna control mechanism
and the C&D panel is substantially simplified with the removal of motor drives,
limit switches, talkbacks, wires, and the like.
Lidar System - AP200.	 The lidar system is basically a laser user integrated -
into a gimbaled contamination container.	 The astronaut activities will be to
` remove contamination covers, orient the lidar from its launch position to its
l normal operating position, and to remove gimbal latching devices.
Gimbal Accelerator System --AP300. 	 The gimbalaccelerator system is quite
similar to the lidar system in that the EVA task only consists of removing and
stowing a contamination cover and removal of gimbal latches.
Remote Sensing Platform - AP100. 	 Preparing the remote sensing platform
for operation requires that an astronaut verify that the canister pressure has
vented down to the ambient conditions; if not, then he will open a vent valve-
- and ensure evacuation.	 The astronaut unlatches each of the mechanical devices.
He then removes the contamination cover and transfers it to the second astronaut
_ who secures it to ,a designated fixture.	 With the cover stowed, the astronauts
position the sunshield by manually extending it to its limit. 	 Final EVA activity
consists of unlocking the gimbal mount.	 Each astronaut unlatches two of the
mechanisms closest to his station.
r.
2.1.2	 Space Telescope (ST)
I
The ST is classified as a current design reusable payload with the design
compatible with on-orbit servicing as well as retrieval and refurbishment on
i earth.
2.1.2.1	 Baseline System
The object of the ST program is to utilize the large high quality telescope
and a variety of complementary instruments to provide astronomical observations
that are not possible with ground-based telescopes. 	 Observations in the ultra-
violet and infrared regions of the spectrum will be emphasized. 	 The specific
'observational program for the 'ST is still being planned. 	 It is planned that a
single instrument can be utilized during the 1980-1991 time period by use of
j periodic on-orbit servicing and less frequently, return to earth for refurbish-
ment.	 The study schedule calls for 'telescope delivery to 28.5 deg inclination,
I
G
p
520 km orbit.
e.
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Servo drive mechanisms are provided to drive the telescope sunshade to its
extended position and provide for opening of the sunshade aperture door. A
flexible power and ground umbilical between the spacecraft and orbiter is
utilized in order to allow movement of the spacecraft prior to release from the
orbiter. An automated utnoilical release and reconnect device will be required.
Automated deployment systems are provided for spacecraft solar panels and
communication antennas. These will be actuated after the LST is deployed to
the point of clearing the orbiter structure.
2.1.2.2 Baseline Payload Operations
J	 Delivery Missions. Following a-visual inspection of the payload using
}
	
	 the orbiter CCTV systems, ST boost locks will be released and the spacecraft
rotated to allow extension of the telescope sunshade. At this time the solar
arrays and communication antennas can be deployed and test and checkout of
subsystems started. The complexity of the telescope, and its instrumentation
requires an extensive checkout time interval prior to release of the payload
from the orbiter. A 48-hour quiescent period prior to opening the telescope
cover is recommended. This will allow contamination clearing and the establish-
I
	
	
ment of thermal equilibrium in the telescope structure. After cover opening
another period of ST operations checks will be performed. After satisfactory
j	 completion of checkout, the ST separation operations will be performed.
f
Servicing Missions. ST design concepts have included the use of a modular
subsystem and component arrangement with provisions for manual, EVA servicing.
Special module exchange mechanisms, possibly activated through the RMS system,
i
	
	
would be a requirement for automated servicing and exchange of components in
the scientific instrument package (SIP) and the support systems module (SSM)
of the ST, though such systems are not required by the current baseline concept.
I
Retrieval Missions. The ST study schedules call fora first retrieval
and ground refurbishment of the spacecraft after one year of on-orbit operations
and a second refurbishment after an additional 1-3 years of on-orbit operations.
Capture and docking operations will be identical to the same activity of the
servicing mission. Preparation for return will include automatic retraction
of the ST sunshield, closing of the sunshield cover, retraction of _solar panels,
and retraction of the communication antennas. These activities must be completed
before the ST can be rotated completely into the payload bay. After rotation
into the bay, the entry latches will be fastened.
2.1.2.3 ST EVA Applications
EVA can eliminate cert.-.- ., of the automated devices for deployment and
retraction of spacecraft eg7 A_pment. The discussion of the EVA concepts for
payload delivery, payload servicing, and payload retrieval missions for the ST
are given below. The ST payload and typical EVA applications are illustrated`
in Figure '2-2.
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Figure 2-2. ST EVA Operations
Delivery Missions. Boost 'latch release for the ST remains an automated
operation because it is a Shuttle-provided function. For EVA operations, the
ST should be rotated out of the payload bay as shown in the figure. Major EVA
activities identified for preparation of the ST include sunshade extension,
deployment of solar arrays, deployment of communication' antennas, and disconnec-
tion of the orbiter-to-payload umbilical. EVA operations, also include items
such as release of the boost locks of the extended devices, sunshade cover,
and inspection of the spacecraft prior to deployment. The long duration test -
and checkout operations for the ST are performed in the automated mode. The
EVA crew egresses again after checkout tests are completed to assist in the
umbilical removal and final separation operations.
Servicing Missions. EVA operations are utilized for retraction of extended
devices to the extent necessary prior to EVA servicing. EVA is also used to
connect the orbiter-to-spacecraft umbilical, inspection of spacecraft, installa-
tion of safety items, and access of the spacecraft spares.
Retrieval Missions.- The EVA-oriented retrieval mission operations for the
ST are similar to the servicing mission operations described above relative to
rendezvous, capture, and docking with the spacecraft. Instead of the servicing
operations, the ST will be prepared for entry. EVA_ activities -include securing
extended devices, inspection of the spacecraft, and attachment; of the orbiter-
to-spacecraft umbilical. These activities will be accomplished prior to rotating
the ST entirely within the orbiter payload bay.
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2.1.3 LANDSAT/MKS
2.1.3.1 Baseline System'
This payload exemplifies a low cost reusable design. The payload is
installed in the orbiter together with an automated module exchange mechanism
for on-orbit servicing. The MMS design concept consists of "standard bust'
modules for spacecraft functions, with various configurations of special mission
equipment mounted on a.forward structural ring. The objectives of the program
are to continue a wide ranging program of earth observations to support the long
range goals of scientific disciplines such as agriculture, geology, meteorology,'
hydrology, and oceanography.
	
(	 Major payload sensors for the representative payload include the (1) thematic
	
mapper, (2) radar imager,^	 	 g	 (3) high resolution imager, and (4) pollution monitor-
ing package. The on-orbit support equipment consists of two major elements,
(1) the payload retention and positioning system which holds the payload in the
orbiter during ascent and then rotates the payload out of the payload bay, and
(2)` the special purpose manipulator system which is used for module exchange on
servicing missions.
I
2.1.3.2 Baseline Payload Operations
j
The MMS earth observations program will operate a'sequence of satellites in
sun synchronous orbits starting in 1979.
Delivery Missions. The automated approach to LANDSAT activation and check-
out will start with preparation of the orbiter payload specialist station. A
visual check of the payload may be made using closed circuit television installa-
tions in the orbiter bay and on the remote manipulator system. Checkout of cer-
tain payload sensors and subsystems can be made while the payload is in the
stowed position. The positioning platform will then erect the payload out of
the orbiter bay to a vertical position. Solar panel erection and unfolding
and radar antenna extension will be verified. These items will be returned to
a stowed configuration prior to payload boost to operational orbit. Contamina-
tion shields of payload subsystem optical components will be opened.
Maintenance Missions. The MKS flight support system (FSS) concept has been 1
developed toprovide an automated on-orbit servicing system. The basic concept
of the FSS is the exchange of major modules of the spacecraft subsystems and
mission (payload sensors) equipment.
a
s
The 'automated routine of MMS capture and docking operations begin with
preparation of the FSS and RMS control. The boost locks on the FSS will be
released and the payload positioning platform rotated to the vertical orienta-
tion to receive the spacecraft. The orbiter RMS will be attached, and the
LANDSAT maneuvered into position to be captured by the positioning platform
docking latches. During capture the Shuttle-to-payload umbilicals will auto-
matically be attached.
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r	 Major maintenance functions will be performed by the FSS module exchange
mechanism (MEM). The appropriate spare modules in the FSS storage compartment
will be removed, by the MEM, elevated to the payload module position where the
MEM will withdraw the used module, replace it with the new module, and then
return the expended module to the _storage compartment. The procedure will then
be repeated until all the required payload module replacements have been
	
i
accomplished. Certain payload component replacements (e.g., the radar antenna)
will require the use of the'RMS in the component interchange.
Retrieval Missions. After the planned mission is completed or after system
1
malfunction for which on-orbit maintenance is not practical, the spacecraft will
be retrieved and returned to earth for major refurbishment activities. The
capture and docking operations for retrieval will generally be identical to
that of the similar activity of the routine; servicing missions.
2.1.3.3` LANDSAT EVA Applications
The EVA-oriented design and operations maintain the design and function of
the baseline automated flight support system as wellas that of the spacecraft
itself. The basic LANDSAT configuration and typical EVA applications are
illustrated in Figure 2-3.
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Figure 2-3. LANDSAT and Flight	 g	 Support System EVA Operations
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Delivery Missions.	 One function is performed in the stowed position. 	 The
EVA concept for this operation would be to use a portable power tool to rotate
the erection platform (and attached spacecraft) out of the orbiter payload bay
into a payload release position.	 These functions could be performed by EVA as
either a primary mode or as a backup.
Preliminary payload activation and checkout are the same in the EVA modes
as in the ;automated_mode of operations.	 EVA activities are subsituted for
automated device operations in the release of boost latches and monitoring of
the checkout of mechanical systems.-
The major EVA substitutions in payload activation operations involve EVA
utilization of a portable power tool in place of built -in automated mechanisms
in the release of the payload and in the rotation of the payload positioning
platform.	 The deployment of the payload and separation from the orbiter will
be accomplished in the same manner as with the automated system.
Maintenance Missions.	 The EVA-oriented approach to maintenance utilizes
the portable power tool and monitoring and alignment adjustments in the module
exchange operations.	 A design concept for manual replacement of the communica-
tion antenna on the MMS resulted in simplified mechanization compared with
baseline RMS operations. 	 EVA capability also is better able to cope with minor
repairs and adjustments discovered during detailed visual inspection of the
spacecraft.
1
_d
Retrieval Missions.	 The retrieval operations are the same as those
required for servicing operations described above. 	 The operations utilize
manual operating latches for securing the payload and appendages for entry.
EVA inspection and installation of contamination shields and safety devices"
replace the automated systems for these activities._
2.1.4
	
Stellar Astronomy Spa,celab Payload (ASP)
2.1.4.1	 Baseline ;System
The stellar configuration for ASP is typical of several all-up cargo bay
concepts currently being evaluated for Shuttle integration.	 The various science'
sensors are installed on five pallet sections in the cargo bay of the orbiter.
Typically, three sets of Small Instrument Pointing Subsystem (SIPS) gimbal'
installations are installed one to a pallet.	 Each SIPS provides an erection_
capability and mounting for two canisters with independent gimbaling.	 Each of
the six canisters contains selected compatible sensors for celestial. investi-
gations.	 A large (one meter) UV optical telescope is mounted on the two re-
maining pallets and operated on an ESA Instrument Pointing System (IPS).	 Pri-
mary objectives of the payload are to obtain UV imagery surface brightness and
spectra.in a range of radiation bands. a
A
s
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r 2.1.4.2 Baseline Payload Operations
Operations for the SIPS-mounted canisters will consist basically ofremote
release of retention latches of the erection mechanisms and gimbals, followed'
by erection of the units above the Shuttle moldline. Sensor covers will be
opened and various checks on calibrations will be performed before initiating
programmed operations.
i
The UV telescope will be engaged to the IPS, then released remotely from
its boost retention latches. _Subsequently, the telescope will be erected and
prepared for operation.
2.1.4.3 -ASP EVA Operations
	 i
Figure 2-4 illustrates the ASP stellar astronomy payload and typical EVA
interface,
_101f.
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Figure 2-4. ASP EVA Operations
In'preparing the payload for operation, the EVA crewman would most likely
start with the UV telescope, and manually engage the IPS and umbilical connector
to the telescope. Next, the three flight support latches would be released with
manual over-center latch mechanisms,. The boost protective cover for the tele-
scope could be manually released and stowed. Finally, the crewman would
observe the remotely commanded telescope erection to ensure clearance control.
-	
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Proceeding forward through the bay to the two SIPS-mounted Schmidt camera
canisters, the crewman will remove thetwo optics covers, unlatch four locks on
the gimbals, and release boost latches on the erection mechanism. A portable
drive motor will then be engaged to the erection mechanism to raise the SIPS
assemblies out of the cargo bay.i
	
j	 The next two SIPS assemblies will then sequentially be prepared for opera-
tion in the same manner.
I
2.1.5 Advanced Technology Laboratory (ATL)
The ATL is_a series of dedicated 7-day sortie missions consisting of a
multi-disciplinary payload mounted on standard Spacelab pallets or in combina
Lion with the Spacelab module. The payload contains combinations of such
disciplines as navigation, earth observations, physics, and chemistry, and
environmental effects on material.
2.1.5.1 Baseline System
A two-section pallet utilizes the aft portion of the Shuttle bay. Controls
and displays arelocated internally in a short Spacelab module. The ATL payload
selected for the "EVA" study was defined in the SSPD study as "ATL P/L No. 5
(pallet only),-'ST-23S". The data from that study were modified here to reflect
	
L	 current studies defining various experiments on payloads 1-3. The payload con-
sists of a variety of pallet-mounted experiments.
2.1.5.2 Baseline Payload Operations
I
Following orbit establishment and a sleep period, the Spacelab is activated
and the ATL experiments equipment deployment begins. The ATL payload pallet-
mounted equipment can be deployed sequentially and operated as required for the
	
j	 duration of the mission. The experiments in some cases can be operated without 	 3
man-interface. The baseline mission operation is performed totally from the
Spacelab module.
2.1.5.3 ATL EVA' Applications
The major areas of EVA applications are in the pre-operations phase where
a substantial amount of EVA is used to deploy the various sensors. The EVA
activity required to support pre-operations functions requires, at a minimum,
two astronauts in space suits and at least one in the Shuttle cabin at the PS
station. Figure 2-5 illustrates typical experiments for ATL and EVA interface
applications. The following represents typical EVA tasks.
Microwave Interferometer. The microwave interferometer cruciform deployable-
boom system requires two astronauts. Upon egressi.ng from the airlock, the
astronauts position themselves to observe the deployment process. A''hand-held
power unit is attached to the boom drive system by one astronaut while the
other unlatches the boom tips from the individual boom canisters. Two opposing
booms are deployed simultaneously. This allows each astronaut to observe one
boom arm as it deploys. Upon deployment, the remaining _opposed `booms are
deployed.
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Figure 2-5. ATL EVA Operations
Search and Rescue Aids,. From work station 2, one ;astronaut moves to the
large side-looking radar antenna and positions himself at that work station.
The other astronaut moves to the various antenna boost locks and proceeds to
unlatch each one. Once unlatched the long slender antenna is manually rotated
outward into its operational position, unfolded, and the antenna itself is
properly angled if required by the astronaut. 	 3
Molecular Beam Facility. The neutral gas measuring device is stored in an 	
I
i
evacuated container prig to launch to maintain maximum cleanliness. One
astronaut removes and stows the contamination cover. He then unlatches all boost
latches on the device within the container. After completion of the unlatching
task, the sensor device, which is mounted at the end of a 23-m (75 ft) boom, is
driven outward using an astronaut hand-held power drive unit. Once the unit is
,i	 deployed, the boom 5ysteni is locked in plane.
Ultraviolet Meteor Spectroscopy.' One astronaut vents the contamination
k	 container, removes and stows the cover, and inspects the unit for obvious
damage, or contamination on the camera and UV spectroscope lens. In addition,
he will load film as required.
6
(	 Autonomous Navigation. One astronaut vents any residual pressure in the
t
contamination chamber and the other positions himself to unlatch the ''contamina-
tion covers, remove and stow. The equipment is then inspected visually. The
I`	 astronaut on the unit them removes the gimbal system boost latches.
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Lidar Measurements of Cirrus Clouds. One astronaut positions himself in
the foot restraints, and begins by venting the contamination container.
	 The I
cover latches are unlatched and the cover is removed and stowed.
	 After perform-
ing a visual inspection of the unit, he then removes the boost locks on the
gimbal system.
Non-Metallic Materials Experiment.
	 One astronaut removes the contamination
cover exposing the specimen and unlatches the boost latches.
	 Using the hand-
held power drive tool, he extends the specimen tray the prescribed height.
2.2	 PAYLOAD CHARACTERISTICS/EVA INTERFACE
Each representative payload was analyzed to determine physical character-
istics and potential impact on EMU requirements.	 These data were assembled
into formats to assist in reviews with in-house and NASA payloads personnel.
Each set of data sheets is presented below.
2.2.1
	
Atmospheric, Magnetospheric and Plasmas in Space (AMPS)
g
i
I.	 PAYLOAD DESCRIPTION (Reference Drawing No. 4260-.122)
I
A.	 Atmospheric, Magnetospheric and Plasmas in Space (AMPS)
B.	 NASA Headquarters - PHY-7.; SSPD - AP-06A 1
C.	 Atmospheric and Space Physics
D.	 Spacelab and Pallet
E.
	 Consumables - GN2, LN2, Film (30 kg)(66 lb) j
j F.	 Orbits - 28.5/90 degrees inclination, 320 to 500 km (173 to 270 nm)
II.	 SUMMARY OF CANDIDATE EVA TASKS
A.	 Deployable Satellites
i 1,	 Unlatch-satellite boost locks
2.	 Assist attaching RMS to satellite
_3.	 Assist placement of satellite after recovery
4.	 Secure satellite; entry latches
B. _ Boom , System l
1.	 Assemble two 5-m pole booms; install into Boom A platform
2.	 Unlatch Boom A boost locks
3.	 Unlatch Boom B boost locks
4.	 On entry, reverse (3), 	 (2)	 and (1)
C.	 Transmitter/Coupler System
1.	 Remove contamination cover
2.	 Deploy dipole antenna using hind-held power unit
3.	 Reverse (2) and (1) for entry
I
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C
D. Lidar System
1 Depressurize lidar canister
2. Replace lidar boost latches
3. Store canister cover
4. Reverse (1), (2),
 
and (3) for entry
E. Gimbaled Accelerator System
1. Remove contamination covers and stow
2. Reverse for entry
F. Remote Sensing Platform
1. Vent RSP container
2. Unlatch`, remove, and stow RSP cover
:-	 3. Deploy sunshield
4. Release gimbal
III. EVALUATION OF EVA INTERFACES
A. Structures
1. Twist, push and pull latches and boost locks
2. Handhold near each latch and/or lock in excess of 0.6 m (24 in.)
Foot restraints required when handhold cannot be accommodated
3. Handholds must support a push/pull torque of 34 N-m
(300 in.-lb) and foot restraints 170 N-m (1500 in.-lb)'
4. Personnel belt restraints required during equipment assembly
(i.e., boom system - 5 m pole boom installation) 	 1
5. Removal of contamination covers and stowage Covers range from
`	 0.15 m (6 in.) to approximately 1.93 m (1b76 in.)
6. Astronaut body access between equipment
B. Removable Modules (Maintenance)
1. Remove/replace electronics from
a. Remote sensing platform
- Spectrometers	 - Photometer
- Radiometer	 - Cameras
- Interferometer	 - ; Particle >detectors	 a
b. Laser system Transmitter/receiver
c. Transmitter coupler system - Transmitters
d. Boom system
- Magnetometers	 Spectrometers
- Power supply	 - Television
- Ion probes
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C. Moveable/Extendable Elements
i 1. Boom deployments on:
a. Boom system
Two each 50-m (164 ft) booms (Astromast type)
- Two each 5-m (16 ft) booms (hollow pole masts)
2. Extendable devices
a. Boom system
Two each 33-m (108 ft) dipole antenna (stem type)
b. Transmitter/coupler system
Two each 330 -m (1083 ft) dipole antennas (stem type)
3. Moveable devices
a. Lidar system contamination container
b'. Remote sensing platform
- Contamination cover
Sunshade
4. Mass of device being moved and speed
a. Remote sensing platform
Sunshade 112 kg (246.4 lb) moved at 2 cm/sec
(0.78 in./sec)
j	 - Contamination cover 23 kg (50 lb) manual removal
b. Lidar system
Transmitter/receiver and canister 104- kg (228.8 lb)
rotated 90 degrees
c.Transmtter/coupler system
- 330 m dipole, 16 kg (35.2 lb) moving at 1 m/6.6 sec
j	 (39.37 in /6.6 sec)
d. Boom system
-< 50-m astromast boom assy (2 ea.), 560 kg (1232 lb)
(total), moving ,at -2 m/60 sec (1.31 in., /sec)
5 m pole mast assy, 3 kg°(6.6-lb), hand installed
I	 - 33 m dipole antenna asst', 10 kg (22 lb) ,' moving at
L`	 1.2 m/60 sec (0.78 in. /sec)	 #
35. Accessibility
a. Remote sensing platform - 1.9 m (dia.) (74.>8 in.)
3
Contains 11 instruments some of which use cryogenics and	 j
film what may require refurbishments and/or replacement.
I	 Gimbals stem requires locking/unlocking.y	 	 Contamination
container requires stowage;
-	 2-17
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b Lidar system
Requires depressurization, gimbal system latching/
unlatching, some maintenance of optics
i
c. Transmitter/coupler system
Deployment of 330 m dipole antennas via handheld power unit
d. , Boom system
- Assemble two 5-m boom poles and install into Boom A platform
- Unlatch Booms A, and B sensor platforms
- Deploy 33 m dipole antenna. Unlatch Booms A and B
boost locks
e. Deployable units - potential tasks
- Release boost latches on each unit as required
Deploy ` spherical/cylindrical balloons
f. Subsatellite system
- Assist RMS mating with subsatellites for deployment
- Release boost 'locks
- Assist in recovery of satellites
D. Materials, Surfaces, Sensors, etc.
1. Contamination sensitive items
a. Spectrometer, XUV; UV, VIS, IR; SWIR Fourier; IR Fourier
b. Radiometer, IR
c. Interferometer
d. Photometer
e. UV-VIS camera
f. Lidar system
g. Television
h. Light source, artificial
2. Temperature characteristics j
a. Non-operating temperatures at sensor:
Low = 198°K (-103°F)
High = 328 °K (+131°F) 9
b. Operating temperature at sensor:
Low =- 258°K (+5.4°F)
High 328°K (+131°F)
C. Structures range:
i
Low	 1440K (-200°F)
High =' 422°K (+300°F)
3 Acceleration sensitivity
a. Translational acceleration
- 50m-booms A and B
- 330 m - stem dipole antenna
- 33 m stem dipole antenna
- 5- m - boom (pole type)
- Laser 'system - laser and gimbal
- Remote sensing platform gimbal
-2-18
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b. Rotational acceleration - see above items
c. Contact sensitivity
E. Energy Sources
1. Pyrotechnics
a. Bolt charge ignitors
b. Manual jettison alternative
C. Barium canister with explosive charges
2. AC power - 110 volts
3. DC power	 Storage banks, 2-5 kilojoules, 28 volts
4. Gases - Pressurization of contamination canisters (less than
7 x 106 N/m2, 1000 Asia)
5 Cryogenics
6. RF generated energy
a. Ion accelerator
b. Electron accelerator
c. MPD-arc
7. Laser Lidar system
8. Ionizing radiation Gimbaled accelerator , system
9. Combustables - Subsatellite system
10._ Electrostatic charge TBD
1
2.2.2 Space Telescope (ST)
I. PAYLOAD DESCRIPTION (Reference Drawing No. 4260-113)
A. Space Telescope (ST)
B. NASA Headquarters - AST-6 SSPD - AS-01-A
C. Astronomy
D. Spacecraft-
E. 9500 kg (at launch) 9500 kg (EOL) (20,900 lb)
13 m (1) x 4.3 m (d)_ ascent mode (42.9 ft' x 14.2 ft)
22.4 m (1)' (73.9 ft) x 15.2 m (50.16 ft) , (w) x 14.2' m (46.9 ft) (h)
deployed mode
F. Consumables - Gas	 GN2 . (purge)
G. Orbital Data - 28.5 degrees, 500 km (270-nm)
II. SUMMARY OF CANDIDATE EVA'TASKS
A. Preparation for Operation and Deployment
1. Remove contamination shields from the sun sensor (1) and
star` trackers (2 each)
_	 2-19
SD 76-SA-0026
2. Unlatch boost locks for the solar panels (2) and
communications antennas (2)
i
3. Rotate communications antennas (2) to operating position
latching in place
4. Extend sunshade (1) -using power tool and latch shade in
extended position
B. Separate Spacecraft
j 1. Remove	 orbiter-to-spacecraft umbilicals and lock in stowed
position
C. Docking Operations
1. Release RMS boost locks and secure locks
f 2. Engage docking latches to spacecraft
3. Unstow umbilical and connect to spacecraft
4.- Unstow and engage spacecraftground transfer mechanism
i
D. Planned Maintenance
1. Unstow and replace contaminationshields on sun sensor (1)
i and star tracker (2)`
2. Open spacecraft access, remove failed component, translate
to spares storage
3. Open spares storage.	 Release restraints.	 Removes spares;
equipment and replace failed unit and secure
' 4. Replace new unit and secure access panel(s)
S: Service fluid system by releasing tank retention latches.
Break disconnect.- Remove tank to storage. 	 Transfer new	 z
j tank.	 Secure and reconnect
E. Prepare for Return
1. Basically a reverse process of II.A. and II.0
III.	 EVALUATION OF EVA INTERFACES
A. Structure
1. Twist, pull and push latches, boost locks, spares storage 	 j
and spacecraft: panel latches_
2. Handholds near each larch and/or lock in excess of 0.6 'm
(24 in.).	 Foot restraints required when handholds cannot
I be accommodated or when both hands are required to perform
r task (i.e.,_ spares retrieval/failed module stowage)
` 3• Handholds must support a push/pull torque of 34 N-m
(300 in.-lb)	 and foot restraints 170 N-m (1500 in.--lb)
4. "Clothes line" type spares transfer system for module
replacement
2-20
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5. Work platforms on pallet and on spacecraft plus mobility
aids in support of maintenance activity
6. Access hatches on spares container and spacecraft
7. Most modules weigh 16 (35.2 lb) to 78 kg (171.6 lb)
'.	 (majority 23-43 kg (50.6-94.6 lb))
B. Removable Modules (Maintenance)
1. Remove/replace equipment boxes from
a. Spacecraft subsystems
b. Spacecraft experiment equipment
C. Movable /Extendable Elements
1 Elements
a. Sunshade, right circular cylinder; 320 ,kg (704 lb)
b. TDRS antennas; 2 ea. 4.54 m (15 ft) Astromasts 10 kg (22 lb)
c. Solar array; - 33.5 m2 ; 185 kg (364-.8 ft2; 407 kg)
d. Sensor opticcovers; multiple shapes and weights
2. Time criticality = None identified; Potential loss of GN2
D. Materials, Surfaces, Sensors
1. Contamination sensitive items
1
a. Telescope lenses
b. Sun sensor	 1
C. Star trackers	 i
2. Temperature characteristics/data
Internal temperature 294 + 2°K (70 + 2j0F)
a. Telescope interior - optically black
b. Sunshade and telescope barrel solar,reflectur coating
c. SIP section bare aluminum interior, MU exterior
d. SSM section bare aluminum interior, MU or MU coating.
White radiator areas. Base - anodized aluminum/black
CAT-A-LAC coating. Interior high emittance satin
finish, ,light color
3. Acceleration sensitivity (g) - None identified
4. Contact sensitivity
MLI - can be damage
Solar panels - easily broken
E. Energy Sources (1975 SSPD)
1. Pyrotechnics - None indicated
2. AC power - None required
3. DC power _, 2200 W peak
1500 W avg (50.4 kwhr)
28 vdc
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2.2.3 LANDSAT /MMS
I. PAYLOAD DESCRIPTION (Reference Drawing No. 4260-111)
A. LANDSAT
B. NASA Headquarters - EO-3 7 SSPD - EO-8-A
C. Earth Observations - GSFC
D. Spacecraft (with built-in velocity package)
i
E. 3475 kg (7645 lb) (at launch); 2953, kg (6497 lb,) (EOL)
3.05 m (10.1 ft) (w) x 2.8 m (9.2 ft) (d) x 11.0 m (36.3 ft) (h) -
ascent mode
6.53 m (21.5 ft) (w) x 2.8 m (9.2 ft) (d) x 11.0 m (36.3 ft) (h) -
deployed mode
j	 F. Consumables ii
1.` Gas - cold gas
2. Propellant - hydrazine.' Solid engine (SVM-2 rocket)	 l
II SUMMARY OF CANDIDATE EVA TASKS
A. Preparation for Operations and Deployment
1.' Remove contamination shields from all spacecraft subsystem
optics and scientific sensors'
2. Unlock boost latches for solar panel. Unfold and lock solar
panel sections in open position
3. Release boost locks on docking platform and rotate platform
and MMS to vertical
s	
4.' Assist RMS attachment; release platform/MMS retention devices
r	 5. Remove spacecraft umbilical and stowi
f	 B. Docking Operations
1. Release boost locks in preparation for docking
i	 2. Manually assist payload positioning to docking ring
3. Operate docking latches
4. Retrieve umbilical and connect to payload
C. Planned Maintenance
1 Replace sensor covers
2. Remove spacecraft covers and stow
3. Safety spacecraft phyrotechnics
4. Remove storage covers and spares restraints
5. Perform equipment/spares' exchange for unique mission equipment
6. Clean equipment as required
i
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D. Prepare for Return
1.	 Perform operations under II.B.1 through 4
2.	 Replace protective shields (II.A.1)
3.	 Engage entry latches on solar panel and antennas (II.A.2)
4.	 Perform following steps in reverse manner:
a.	 Step II.A.4
b.	 Step II.A.3
III.	 EVALUATION OF EVA INTERFACES
A. Structures
1.	 Twist, push and pull of latches and boost locks
2.	 Handhold near each latch and/or lock in excess of 0.6 m (24 in.)
Foot restraints required when handholds cannot be accommodated.
3.	 Handholds must support a push/pull torque of 34 N-m
(300 in.-1b) and foot restraints 170 N-m (1500-in.-lb)
4.	 Personnel belt restraints required during equipment exchange
('u250 kg (550 lb))
5. ` Removal of contamination covers and stowage.
	 Range of covers_
0.6 m (2 ft) to approximately 0.15 m (05 ft)
' 6.	 Astronaut body access between equipment
7.	 Work platforms with foot restraints and belt restraints
mounted on spacecraft
B. Removable Modules (Maintenance)
1.	 Remove/replace electronic boxes from
a._ Attitude control system
b.	 Power module
_c.	 Orbit adjust package
I
2. ,Remove/replace scientific equipment packages
a.	 Communications
b.	 Synthetic aperture radar atenna
C. Movable/Extendable Devices
1.	 Positioning platform capture latches
a.	 Mass - 2 kg (4.4 lb) 4 required
" b.	 Torque - 3 N-m (24 in.-lb)
2.	 Positioning platform rotation mechanism
i a.	 Mass -- 4 kg (8.8 lb), 1 required
b.	 Torque - 20 N-m (180 in.-1b)
D. Materials, Surfaces, Sensors -
1.	 Contamination sensitive items
a.	 Thematic mapper	 t
_
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b. High resolution imager
c. Pollution monitoring system
2. Temperature characteristics
a. Non--operating tee peratures
(1) Sensors: 248°K (-13°F) to 398°K (257°F)
(2) General structure: 58°K (-354°F) to 398°K (257°F)
b. Operating temperatures
(1) Sensors: 258 0K (5.4°F) to 323 0K (121°F)
(2) Spacecraft subsystems: 278°K (41 0 F) to 328°K (131°F)
3. Acceleration sensitivity (g)
a. Translation - 3.5 g max
b. Rotation 0.1 degree/sect
4. Contact sensitivity
a. Solar panels
b. SAR antenna
c." Sensor lenses
E. Energy Sources
1. Pyrotechnics
_a. Bolt charge ignitor (shorting plug)
2. AC power - none required
3. DC power •- 28 vdc
4. Gases - propellants
Pressurant for propulsive motors 	 '.
Hydrazine replacement
5. Cryogenics none
6. Combustables
a. Hydrazine	 j
b. Solid state motor (SVM-2)	 r
2.2.4 Astronomy Spacelab' Payload (ASP)	 -	 it
I. DESCRIPTION (Reference Drawing No. 2617-1)
A. Astronomy Spacelab Payloads (ASP)
B. NASA P/L AST-10 (similar to elements of SSPD AS-04,-41, 66)
C. UV-Stellar Astronomy - GSFG
D. Spacelab Pallet
I
E. 14,507 kg (31,915 lb), 15 m (49.5 ft) length x 4.5 m (14.8 ft) dia.
F. F*^!-, 'cryogenics, and helium
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II. SUMMARY OF EVA TASKS
A. Release 3 flight support latches on SUOT
B. Attach IPS to SUOT
C. Remove and stow SUOT boost cover, observe erection of SUOT
D. Release 2 launch/landing restraints on Schmidt camera SIPS
and 4 gimbal locks
E. Remove 2 camera covers and erect SIPS pedestal., observe SIPS
erection
F. Release 2 launch/landing restraints on IR telescope and
S w r	 m	 SIPS. Release gimbala s it camera 	ele  4 locksb	c	 z ch d o g
G. Remove and stow covers from camera and IR telescope and erect
SIPS pedestal and observe SIPS erection
H. Release 2 launch/landing restraints on UV sensor modules SIPS
Release 4 gimbal locks
I. Remove and stow covers 'from:
UV photometer
EUV imaging telescope
IUE spectrograph
EUV spectrometer
UV polarimeter
Microchannel spectrometer
Erect SIPS pedestal
Observe SIPS erectionj
J. At conclusion of sortie, observe retraction of all SIPS mounted	 1
modules and SUOT. Disconnect SUOT from-IPS. Replace all sensors j
and telescope covers, install gimbal locks and engage launch/
landing restraints. Remove film canisters from Schwarzschild
and 2 Schmidt cameras and transport to 'airlock.
f	 III. EVALUATION OF EVA INTERFACES
A. Structures
	
l	 1. Push/pull at module ends	 I
2. Access between modules
3. Push/pull at gimbal and SIPS/FSS pedestals
4. Foot-restraints-on pedestals/pallet at 170 N-m (1500 in.-1b) torque
B. Film Exchange/Removal (Schmidt - 10 kg (22 lb))
	
1	 1. Foot restraints on module
2 Push/pull on camera beside film cartridge
C. Deploy SIPS
1. Motor (or manual) drive
a. Mass: Several 27-36 kg (60-80 lb) up-down/left-right per SIPS
b. Time-to-deploy/retract: 3 minutes
2-w-31 
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c. (Manual) torque per concept: use hand held motor drive
d. Module/sensor sensitivity: not sensitive	 i
e. Access: marginal
D. Materials, Surfaces, Sensors
1. Contamination sensitivity/requirements
. water vapor, RCS firingsa. W photometer	 a•	
_P ^	 g	 1
b EUV imaging telescope: water vapor, RCS firings
c. IUE spectrograph: _water vapor, RCS firings
d. EUV spectrometer: water vapor, RCS firings
e EUV polarimeter: water vapor, RCS firings
f. Mi.crochannel spectrometer: water vapor, RCS firings
g. IR telescope: water vapor
h. Schwarzchild camera: RCS firings
i. Scmidt cameras: RCS firings
j. UV optical telescope: water vapor, RCS firings
1
2., Temperature characteristics
a. Typical module: 172/340°K (-150/+150°F)
b. UV optical telescope: 166/322°K (-160/+120°F)
3. Acceleration sensitivity (translation path)
a._ SIPS
b. Photometer/spectrometer modules
C. Telescope modules
d. Camera modules
e. W optical telescope
4. Contact sensitivity
a. Pressure allowables/sensitive areas: canisters - TBD
l
^	 b	 Specific "work cover" requirements: none
!	 E. Energy Sources
I	 ,
1. Pyrotechnics
a. Shorting plug,
b. Manual jettison alternative
c. Blast/protective direction
{	 2. AC power - 1100 watts, 120 volts
!	 a.- Access
b. Grounding
3. DC power	 4400 watts,, 28 volts
4. Gases - helium
i	 5. Cryogenics	 yes
F. Operations Requirements
1. Mission/preparation time constraints`
2. EVA interface design size/shape constraints 	 !
3. EVA access constraints
SD 76-SA-0:026	 9
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2.2.5 Advanced Technology Laboratory (ATL)
I. PAYLOAD DESCRIPTION (Reference Drawing No. 2511-1)
A. Advanced Technology Laboratory (ATL)
B. NASA Headquarters - ST-2 SSPD - ST-23-S
C. Space Technology
D. Spacelab and Pallet
E. 3228 kg (7102 lb) 15 m (1) (49.5 ft)- 4.5 m (14.8 ft) (d)
F. GN2 , Film
II. SUMMARY OF CANDIDATE EVA TASKS
A. Microwave Interferometer
1. Unlatch each boom boost latch mechanism of cruciform
extendable 38 m (125 ft) boom
2. Attach hand held power drive mechanism deploying antenna booms
3. Reversal of 1 and 2 above for entry
B. Search and Rescue Aids
1. Unlatch antenna boost locks
2. Rotate antenna to operational position
3. Reverse of 1 and 2 above for entry
C. Molecular Beam Facility and Experiments
1. Unlatch, remove and stow container cover
2. Unlatch sensor boost latches	 a
3. Attach power drive unit and extend .,eiLsor boom
	
s
4. Reverse above procedures for entry
D. Ultraviolet Meteor spectroscopy From Near-Earth Orbit
1. Vent container of pressurant
2. Vent contamination container
3. Unlatch, remove and stow contamination cover
4. Load film as required	 -?
5. Reverse above procedure for entry
3
E. Autonomous Navigation/Earth Pointing, also Autonomous Navigation/
Horizon Sensor
1. Vent container of pressurant
2. Unlatch, remove and stow contamination cover
3. Unlatch gimbal system boost locks
4. Reverse above procedure for entry
F. Lidar Measurements of Cirrus Clouds and Lower Stratospheric Aerosols
1. Vent container of pressurant
2. Unlatch, remove and stow contamination cover
3. Unlatch gimbal system boost locks
4. Reverse above procedure for entry
2-33
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G. Non-Metallic Materials
1. Unlatch, remove and stow contamination cover(s)
2. Attach hand held power drive and deploy boom
3. Reverse (1) and (2) above for entry
III.	 EVALUATION OF EV:A INTERFACES
A. Structures
1. Twist, push and pull of latches and boost locks
2. Handhold near each latch and/or lock in excess of 0.6 m (24 in.)
Foot restraints required when handhold cannot be accommodated
3. Handholds must support a push/pull torque of 34 N-m
(300 in.-lb) and foot restraints 170 N-m (1500 in.-lb)
4. Personnel belt restraints required during equipment assembly
(i.e., microwave radiometer horn antenna, antenna mass ti242 kg
(532 lb))
. 5. Removal of contamination covers and stowage. 	 Covers range from
0.45 m;(18 in.) to approximately 1.5 m-(ti56 inches)
6. Astronaut body access between equipment a
7. Work platform with foot restraints and belt restraints allowing
rotation of equipment (i.e., side-looking radar unit, Ref. II.B)
m
B.
1
Removable Modules (Maintenance) 	 {
1. Remove/replace electronics from microwave interferometer
1 kg ea, 'ul0 units
3
2. Remove film cassettes from UV meteor spectroscopy-
C. Movable/Extendable Elements
r	 ( 1. Boom deployments on	 3
a.-	 Microwave interferometer; 4 booms, 38 m (125 ft) ea	 I
b.	 Molecular beam facility and experiments; 1 boom, ,22.7 m (75 ft)
^ 2. Extendable devices - Non-metallic materials; 10 m (33 ft)
.
3. Movable -Devices
a.	 Search and rescue aids; 1 antenna 9.4 m (31 ft)
b'.	 Molecular beam facility and experiments; 1 canister 1 m'(d)
.
x 1.8 m _(1)
l 4. Mass of 'device being moved and speed
i a.	 Microwave interferometer; boom - 39 kg each boom, traveling
at 1.2 m/sec	 (5 fpm)	 i
b.	 Molecular beam facility and experiment; 114 kg, traveling
at 1.2 m/sec (5 fpm)
C.	 Non-metallic materials; 1.2 kg, traveling at 2.4 m/sec (10 fpm)
d.	 Search and rescue aids: 454 kg. 	 Rotation time not to exceed
E	 i 0.05 hour (3 minutes)
t
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e. Molecular beam facility and experiment; 174 kg, traveling
at 1.2 m/sec (5 fpm). 	 Also rotation of canister is required
i through an arc of `L45 degrees.
5. Accessibility
a. The following items are mounted within circular containers:
(1)	 Microwave interferometer
(2)	 Molecular beam facility and experiments
(3)	 Ultraviolet meteor spectroscopy
(4)	 Lidar meteor spectroscopy and lower stratospheric aerosols
I
j (5)	 Autonomous navigation/earth pointing and/horizon sensor'
D.	 Materials, Surfaces, Sensors
1. Contamination sensitive items
a. Starfield/landmark tracker
b. TV camera
j C. Spectrograph, panchromatic
j d. Meteor detector photomultiplier
j e. Lidar optics systems
f. Lidar receiving telescope
g., Image intensifier camera
h. Photometer
i. Pointing telescope
J. Crystal quartz microbalance
i k. Non-metallic specimen
2. Temperature characteristics
a. Non-operating temperatures generally allow a temperature
at the sensor to hold at a low of 278°K (41°F).	 The high
temperature for pure structures is 339°K (151°F), and 313°K
(104°F) at the sensors.
b. operating temperatures are same as above
3. Acceleration sensitivity
a. Rotational sensitivity
(1)	 Microwave interferometer antenna booms
(2)	 Molecular beam facility and experiments
(3)	 Non-metallic materials specimen tray support boom	 9
b. Translation accelerations	 I
-(1)	 Microwave interferometer antenna booms
(2)	 Autonomous navigation/earth pointing gimbal assembly
(3)	 Non-metallic materials specimen tray ;support
(4)	 Molecular beam facility and experiments support boom
4. Contact sensitivity
I
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ii
E.	 Energy Sources
i
1.	 Pyrotechnics
a.	 Bolt charge ignitor (shorting plug)
b.	 Manual jettison alternative (astronaut/AfU)
2.	 AC power - 115 vac maximum
!	 3.	 DC power - 28,vdc maximum
4.	 Gases
a.	 Pressurization of contamination containers.	 Storage
b.	 Containers less than 7 x 10 6 N /m2 (1000 psi)
5.-	 Cryogenics - none
6.	 RF energy generatedi
a.	 RF-- search/rescue aids - TBD
_	 7.	 Laser
a.	 Lidar measurements of Cirrus clouds and lower stratosphericj	
aerosols - TBD
,I
8.	 Ionizing radiation - none
r
9.	 Combustables - none
10.	 Electrostatic charges - none
2.3- PAYLOADS CHARACTERISTICS SUMMARY
The five payloads analyzed in the study consisted of two automated space-
craft -and three sortie payloads in four different scientific disciplines. 	 The
sortie payloads encompass over 20 unique "experiments".	 Consumables in these
j	 payloads include GN2 , LN2,"film, N2H4 (hydrazine), and solid state motors.
Fifteen unique EVA tasks were found on the five payloads. 	 These were performed
j	 generally two to 14 times on each mission.	 Operating temperatures ranged from
i	 258 to 323'K (5.4 to 131°F). 	 Structural temperatures identified by payloads
projects ranged from 58 to 422'K (-354 to 300 0 F). 	Potential hazardous elements
included RF'and ionizing radiation, cryogenics, pyrotechnics, and laser. 	 Every
}	 payload included sensors, subject to damage	 and contamination.
I
I
j
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SECTION ill. EMU REQUIREMENTS
This section describes current technology extravehicular mobility units
and assesses on
-going EMU developments. These data constitute a baseline
for evaluating potential requirements. The section also presents the preliminary
assessment of requirements areas, analyses of requirements and statistical anal-
yses of integrated payloads missions.
3.1 EMU ASSESSMENT
Four specific pressure suit designs or design concepts were selected for
evaluation:
1. Apollo/Skylab EMU A7L-B
2. Advanced Extravehicular Suit (AES)
I
3. Shuttle E11U - JSC Concept
4. Ames Research Center Space Suit Assembly
Although some comparative data are presented in this section, it should be noted
(1) that no standardized system has been adopted for measuring_ characteristics
of EMU's, (2) only two of the suits described in this section have been fabri-
cated--the other two reflect predicted characteristics/requirements.
3.1.1 Apollo/Skylab EMU
1
Following the relatively crude Gemini_ pressure garment assemblies (PGA),
the Apollo EVA suit developed through several phases to a relatively sophisticated
assembly featuring a portable life support system (PLSS) for lunar excursions.
The Skylab EMU, shown in Figure 3-1, utilized the Apollo pressure garment assem-
bly, but relied on life support umbilicals and a portable redundant oxygen
supply in lieu of the ,Apollo PLSS backpack. EVA's on Apollo and Skylab were	 j
conducted from 34 x 10 3 'neCatons/m2 (5 psi) cabin atmospheres, thus warranting
a 25 x,10 3 newtons/m2 (3.7 psi) nominal pressure level suit. The Apollo PGA
and PLSS weights were as follows:
a
PGA plus EVA gloves, visor & ancillary 	 27 kg ( 60 lb)
equipment
PLSS/OPS	 50 kg (110 lb)
y
The A7L suits were custom sized to individual astronauts. The pressure
suit was essentially a rubberized bladder with outer restraint fabric. Joints
were constructed of dipped convolutes. Closure was effected with a full torso -
back zipper.
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f
Comprehensive measurements of the ASL ( pred-
ecessor of the A7L-B) mobility ranges are listed in
Table 3-1, with some data taken from A7L measurements.
Table 3-1. Apollo/Skylab Mobility Data
Mobility Data*
A5L
Deg.
A7L-B
Deg.
Forward flexion 20 120
Left/right lateral 0 35
Left/right rotation 5
Hip flexion 60 60
Flexion/extension 93 93'
oe Reference Figure 3-2	 -
VFORWARD  
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"	 Figure 3••2'. 	 Typical nobility Descriptions''
I	 Contamination sources of the A7L suit have been quantified. 	 Particulate
matter (dust,, lint, metal) have been identified as ranging from 0.5 to 500 	 s
microns.	 Leakage of the suit includes 7 grams (0.016 pound) per hour (primarily	 j
7
02, CO	 and HLO vapor) and organics (trace gases), 0.004 grams (9 5 x 10
-6
k pounds j per hour.	 Of greatest concern perhaps is the H2O coolant vapor from
the backpack of about 0.78 kilograms. (1.7 pounds) per hour (variable).
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3.1.2 Advanced Extravehicular Suit
Advanced technology developments conducted in recent years are typified by
the AES which stressed high mobility capability at a 5 psi operating pressure
level. The suit assembly, illustrated in Figure 3-3, never proceeded to an
operational configuration, consequently is shown without
a thermal-meteoroid outer garment. Similarly, no life
support backpack development was included in the suit
development project; however, it was designed to use the
Apollo PLSS. The AES was never measured comprehensively
r	 as to mobility; however, movies and other subjective data
attest to its capability to approach shirtsleeve levels of
motion. Table 3-2 summarizes incomplete AES mobility data.
Joint design allowed good forward body bending and overall
suit mobility ranges were excellent at 5 psi. The suit was
constructed of multi-laminated (soft) fabrics and featured
joints of rotating conical sections at the shoulder and '^1 +-^
torroidal convolute joints at various extremity locations.
The waist closure was-a horizontal ellipse with a circum-
ferential clamp.
Table 3-2. AES Mobility Data
Figure 3-3.
Advanced Extra-
Vehicular Suit
	 3
a
3.1.3 Shuttle EMU
	
JSC Concept
Recent procurement action was initiated to secure
bids on EMU's for the Shuttle program. Cost and technical
	 ni
proposals were reques'tu.d for suits and life support sys-
	 Qo Tom.
tems for a concept illustrated in Figure 3-4. The follow-
ing data are extracted from the Shuttle EMU Request for
Proposal. 1 /	a
1Request for ,Proposal No. 9-BC7-4^-6-1P, Space Shuttle
iExtravehicular Mobility Unit, dated
_December 12 1975, JSC.
	 Figure 3
-4 Shuttle
EMU - JSC Concept
's
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Forward flexion 90
Left/right lateral 35
Hip Flexion 115
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The EMU system concept is grouped into two major areas. These two areas
F	 consist of the life support subsystem and the pressure garment. The life
support subsystem includes all the life support and cooling fluid conditioning
components, while the pressure garment includes the basic anthropomorphic
pressure vessel, cooling garment, and visor assembly.
The life support subsystems are housed in two modules, one integrated onto
the front, the other onto the bark of the hard upper torso. The back-mounted
module is called PLSS/OPS (portable life support system/secondary oxygen pack).
The front-mounted module is called the DCM (displays and control module). All
interfaces with the hard upper torso are through panels located behind the
modules The design minimizes mounted volume and weight. The location and
size of the DCM is such that the crewman can ,see his feet without difficulty
and all displays and controls are visible and easy to reach. The DCM contains
all EMU displays and controls required to allow a one man EVA. The DCM also
includes the ETU battery and EMU electrical harness up to the communications
j	 carrier assembly. The DCM controls are protected to prevent the inadvertent
actuation by crewman or equipment:
The back-mounted PLSS/OPS module contains the EMU expendables and machin-
ery. The SOP is automatically actuated and is located on the bottom on the
PLSS. The SOP normally remains mounted to the PLSS during flight, but is
removable in flight by a trained crewman with standard tools
The specific design of the pressure garment includes the following
features
a. Hard upper torso
j	 b. Tucked fabric joints	 1
c. Sealed bearings at mobility. joints (shoulder, arm, and
waist elements)
i,
d. Hard ring torso entry closure with sealed bearing
e. Removable bubble-shaped helmet
f. Removable Extra Vehicular Visor Assembly (EVVA) with
replaceable visors
g. Non-custom standard sizing with length adjustment provisions
at the arms and lower torso
h. Non-custom standard sizing range for boots and gloves	 a
Selected Shuttle EMU joint mobility ranges and torques as identified in
the RFP are listed in Table 3-3. The additional_ motions are illustrated in
Figure 3-5.
I
f;
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Table 3-3. Shuttle EMU RFP Mobility Requirements
Mobility Range
(degrees)
Torque
(ft/lb)
SHOULDER MOBILITY
Adduction/Abduction 150 1.0
Lateral/Medial 20/150 1.0
Flexion/Extension 180 1.0
ELBOW MOBILITY
Flexion/Extension 130 1.0
WAIST MOBILITY
Flexion/Extension 90 4.0
Rotation 150 3.0
HIP MOBILITY
Flexion 70 2.0
Abduction 10 2.0
KNEE MOBILITY
Flexion (standing) 120 1.0
Flexion (kneeling) 1.50 1.0
Y	 _
tj
A 
HIP/WAIST	 WAIST MOBIL.	 ELBOW	 HIP ABDUCT.
FLEX /EXTEN.	 SIDE/SIDE,_ROTAT	 (FLEX. EXTEND) (LEG STRAIGHT)
	
I	 '
	
^	 1
r i
SHOULDER	 SHOULDER
ADDUC./ABDUC.	 (LAT. MEDIAL)	 KNEE FLEXION	 KNEE MOBILITY
Figure 3-5. Shuttle EMU RFP Mobility Definitions
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3.1.4 Ames Space Suit Assembly
Figure 3-6 shows the Ames space suit assembly (SSA) which is currently
being developed as an advanced technology design.l A detailed review of advanced
suit configurations, component developments,
and mobility exercised in the AiResearch AES,
Amex AX-2, and Litton RX-4 suits provided the
basis for selection of the configuration
shown. The SSA can be considered as a hybrid t
suit in that it incorporates both hard and
soft suit components.-
Mobility requirements have not been
	 K
defined for the suit as yet. Current plans
call for the suit to be assembled for evalua-
tion by July 1976.	 r
A major factor in the Ames SSA is the
use of 55 x 10 3 newtons/m2 (8 psi) internal
operating pressure, in comparison to the 	 —
28 x 10 3 newtons /m2 (4 psi) Shuttle EMU. Use
of the higher pressure level permits EVA with-
out an oxygen prebreathing period 	 M
Figure 3-7 compares the preparation time
requirements between 55 x 10 3 newtons/m2 (8 psi)	 Figure 3-6. Ames Space Suit
and 28 x 103 newtonsW (4 psi) space suits prior 	 Assembly.
to egress fromthe Orbiter airlock and entry to the
Orbiter payload bay. The use of the 55 x 10 3 newtons/m2 (8 psi) suit is estimated
conservatively to require 1.5 hours of preparation time compared with approximately i
3.5 hours for the lower pressure garment for routine operations. The major
influencing factor is that of the oxygen prebreathing required for approximately
2 hours prior to EVA equipment preparation suit donning, final equipment check
out, and the airlock operations. It should be noted that certain other crew
activities could be performed during the early prebreathing period by use of
portable oxygen masks. EMU design characteristics and airlock operations also
affect, time-to-egress as noted on the bar chart.
Factors other than prebreathing which affectpreparation time include de-
pressurization of the airlock, 5 minutes. However, operational constraints will
usually require intermediate pressure levels between 9 x 10 3 newtons/m2 (14.7
psi) and zero to verify suit integrity, with perhaps 10 to 15 minutes being a
reasonable' minimum. Suit donning time, which has potentially been as low as 5	 4
minutes, can also be expected to require time just to ensure confidence in proper
preparation. Shuttle EMU and advanced technology design concepts should simplify
donning with torso closure and pre-installed backpack,
-	 j
()NASA TMX-62,515 "High Pressure Space Suit Assembly," H. C. Vykukal and
B. W. Webbon, Ames Research Center, December '1975.
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28 x 103 N/M2
PREPARE EQUIPMENT
(4 PSI EMU)
—^ DON EMU
PURGE & C/0
INTERRUPTION IN PRE-BREATHING WILL RESULT IN
INTEGRITY CHECKINCREASED TIME IN NITROGEN DENITROGENIZATION
L
AIRLOCK OPS
i
I
55 x 103
 N/M2
PREPARE EQUIPMENT
(8 PSI EMU) DON EMU
^.^ PURGE & C/0
INTEGRITY CHECK
AIRLOCK OPS
Figure 3-7.
	
EVA System - Response Time
3.2	 PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF PAYLOAD RELATED REQUIREMENTS
In comparison to previous EMU requirements developments, this study was
performed to identify requirements resulting from the application of EVA to
Shuttle payloads. As defined in the referenced EMU RFP, the Space Shuttle program
requires EVA in support of payload, vehicle contingency, and emergency operations.
Typical tasks identified in the RFP are: 	 y
a.
l
Inspection, photography, and possible manual override of
- vehicle and payload systems, mechanisms, and components'.
b. , Installation, removal, and transfer of film cassettes,
material samples, protective covers, and instrumentation.
C. Operation of equipment, including assembly tools, cameras,
and cleaning devices.
d. Cleaning of optical surfaces.
e. Connection, disconnection, and stowage of fluid and 	 y
electrical umbilicals.'
f. Repair, replacement, calibration, and inspection of modular
equipment and instrumentation on the spacecraft or payload.
g.
:
Replacement andrepositioning of antennas.-
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Preliminary analyses were made of requirements so as to penetrate potential
problem areas before conducting meetings at the NASA centers and to allow system-
atic evaluation of requirements. It was determined initially that requirements
would fall into one of three groups: crew protection, crew performance, and
payload protection. Twenty requirement areas or types were identified as falling
into these three groups.
Requirements for the three groups were analyzed as to the derivation source.
For example, flammability requirements for protection of the crewman would
primarily be dependent on design characteristics of the payload; i.e., oxidizer/
fuel elements in the makeup of the payload. Thermal protection is dependent on
design characteristics (equipment mass, a/E surface characteristics, etc.),
operational characteristics (Beta angle, payload attitude, etc.), and crew tasks
(e.g., RTG coolant jacket removal).
In comparison, requirements relating to c,::.:w performance are primarily
derived from the tasks or activities performed by the EVA crewman. For example,
load bearing points (force interfaces) may be established when crew tasks define
force reaction locations. Mobility ranges can best be established by body
attitudes and limb movements required to perform tasks. The analyses deliberately
excluded any EMU requirements which could be derived (or influenced) solely by
crewman physiological characteristics and by environmental requirements. It is
believed that such requirements have received ample attention in the past.
Furthermore, where such requirements were already established and determined to
be at levels which would override payload interface derived requirements, no
further evaluation was performed,
3.2.1 Detailed Level of Analysis
i
Payload designs, payload (mission) operations, and EVA tasks _which could
j	 influence requirements were analyzed and listed, based on their pertinent ele-
ments,. Candidate generic EVA tasks summarized from the analyses described in
Section II, were listed; e.g. latch mechanizm operation or boom assembly, etc.
Payload design characteristics also described in Section II, which influence EMU
requirements were established; e.g., mass properties and surface finishes which
	 {
determine thermal properties, types of fluid systems which could influence
material selection, etc. Mission characteristics were defined as to desired
orbit, attitude constraints, etc., as they affect EMU thermal and radiation
protection.,- Finally, EMU characteristics as identified in the first part of
this section, which could affect payloads were established. table 3-4 summarizes
these characteristics by each of the above categories and relates the require-
ment type to the characteristics. The data presented also serves as a checklist
for the review of requirements presented later.
ji
i
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Table 3-4. Charac=teristics/Requiremen ts Matrix
I. Crew Protection 11. Crew Performance 111. PL Protection
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PAYLOAD DESIGN
Cryogenics X X X
Gases/pressure X X X
Hyperoolics X X
Other liquid/cherical ? ? X
Operable eauipFent X X
Structure shape/Bass X X X X X X
Replaceable corporents X X X X
Antennas X X X
RTG's X X X
Radiators ? X X
Coldplates X X
Bio-systems X
S/C surfaces X X X X X X
Electrical components X X
I xFailure modes X I I I I I I	 X
PAYLOAD MISSION
Altitude X X
Inclination X X
Launch time X
Attitude X
Payload separate/retrieve X
EVA excursions X X
EVA` TASKS
Latches - open/close X X X X X X
Boom assembly/disassembly X X X X X X X
Extendibles-drive/retr. X X X X X X X
Antenna/array-insti./rem._ X X X X X X
Component RSR X X X X X X
Cover remove/install X X X X X
Umbilical make/break X X X X X X
Translation X X
EMU OPERATIONS
Water sublimation X
Gas leakage X
Fabric/covering X X
Antenna X X
Batteries/power X
Visibility X
}
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3.2.2 Mission Operations Analysis
Timeline data from the EVA study were extrapolated to all 572 payload
flights to assist in deriving sizing requirements for life support, EMU life
cycles, payload required exposure to the South Atlantic anomaly, and EVA dura-
tions. The traffic model data were also used in determining task frequencies
and total EVA's.
Numerical summaries Caere made where requirements would be influenced by
frequency of occurrence of EVA with respect to mission elapsed time, EVA dura-
tion times, and number of EVA's per mission. Figure 3-8 presents one MSFC
traffic model mission with multiple payloads. Six candidate EVA work periods
are shown which, are compatible with crew work cycles. Using candidate tasks
and task timelines from the "EVA" study, the following mission sequence was
developed. (l) Two crewmen egress on the first EVA opportunity, and independently
prepare the BESS module for separation. During a remote checkout period, they
jointly prepare a space processing sortie for operation. Upon completion of
`	 this task, final work on the BESS is accomplished through spacecraft separation.
(2) During the second EVA opportunity the two crewmen support Space Telescope
docking and preparation for maintenance. Maintenance tasks are completed on
two subsequent EVA's, followed by separation tasks. (3) The fifth EVA
opportunity is employed in performing EVA tasks associated with docking and
stowing two satellites in preparation for entry. (4) The sixth EVA period,
activity consists Of entry preparations on the sortie payload.
i
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Figure 3-8. Integrated Mission Timeline
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Table 3-5 summarizes the mission operations analysis. Details are also
included as appropriate in individual requirements dicussions. The data in
the table were prepared by summing EVA times on multiple payload missions.
In this respect, the data were not optimized as they could be if each mission
were analyzed separately, and accounts for one 3-man EVA occurring. The
traffic model data called for various combinations of spacecraft delivery,
retrieval, on-orbit maintenance or sortie mode. In general, deliveries were
accomplished in the first or second period, on-orbit maintenance in the second
(and subsequent if required) followed by retrievals. Sortie payloads were
normally set-up in the first period and stowed in the sixth. Of interest in
the table are that most EVA's (about 65 percent) are one man, that 50 percent
of the EVA's occur in the first opportunity, and that 63 percent of the missions
have two EVA's (89 percent have 2 or less).
Table 3-5. EVA Mission Statistics
Total	 i,,:h	 Vi thou tWith
Type	 No.	 EVA	 EVA	 YEVA
NASA & ether	 419	 382	 16	 ^	 91
DoD	 155	 142**	 13**	 i
573*
*Includes One OFT Flight
**Based on 91 Percent, Above
EGA Statistics-. NASA & Other; Non-DoD Only
Type
	
`fission Available EVA Period
	
Total
l	 —	 3	 4.._
EVA Hours	 1235	 267	 170	 70 
1 
61	 580	 2383
So, EVA's, 1-man	 249
	
57	 28	 6 i	 8	 147	 499
	
2-man	 132	 32	 22	 11	 8 {	 66	 271
	
3-man	 1	
-- k --	 l	 -- !	 1
	
Total EVA's	 981	 - 90
	 50	 17	 16 1 213 j 767
AvF.. Hours/UA	 3'.24	 2.96 i	 3.4 }J 4.11	 3, Si
X of. EVA's (767)
	
50	 12	 6.1
	
1	 k	 2	 30	 --
;o.. EVA's per Mission
-!issions ._
	
t	 a ^
	 7	 2	 ^ 3 j	 4 f	 5	 6
Total- M issions	 36	 70	 264	 34	 6 1	 5	 - 3	 4kH.
Total EVA's	 0	 !	 70	 52,8 { 102 . I 24	 25 1	 1S	 :67
of Missions'	 9	 17	 63	 5	 1	 1 j	 I	 --,4
One additional set of statistical data were established to use in the
requirements evaluation. This consisted of a more detailed set of task identi-
fications and an extrapolation of the frequency of occurrence of these tasks.
These data are summarized in Table 3-6. The table was compiled from "EVA"
study data as tothe number of times a task was performed on each of the 13
representative payloads. This number was then multiplied times the number of 	 r
times each payload in the representative group was flown. For example, the
Space Telescope was determined to have three removable sensor contamination
covers. 'There are 38 deliveries of this type of spacecraft--3 x 38 = 114
task performances
1
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Table 3-6. EVA Task Occurrence Frequency
i
1 I	 No. Times
Pl anned EVA Tasks Performed
Remove and stow contamination covers 2,234
Unlatch boost locks (antennas, booms, panels, sensors) 10,159	 lAntenna erection and latching 5$5
Solar array erection and latching 163
Boom erection and latching 1,260
Sunshade deployment 358
erection/deployment 151
S
Mechanisms
Film loading
I
495
Cryogenic loading 109
Instrument pointing system attachment 80llbI	 Sample/specimen installation
I	 Pyrotechnic shorting plug removal ( 3,00$
Launch subsatel I i tes 1 58
Launch deployable units 348
Point/scan instruments 464
Umbilical disconnect 313
Disengage spacecraft (boost latch release) 942
Docking latches release for docking 560
Connect umbilicals 136
Install  safety items 221
Clean sensors/experiments 120
Service fluid systems 28
Retrieve/install contamination covers 1,985
Engage entry latches 8,769
Remove/stow/retract antenna 	 - I	 543 I
Remove/stow/retract solar arrays 1.51 3
Boom retraction and latching 1,209
Sunshade retraction and latching 344
Mechanism retraction and latching 145
Release RMS and stow 140
Film retrieval 495 e
Cryogenic supply vent/stow 109 {
-Sample retrieval-- 116
Shorting plug installation 2,376
rd system
255MS engagement r
I
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3.3 REQUIREMENTS EVALUATION
Each of the requirements areas listed in Table 3-4 are discussed individ-
ually in this subsection. Final conclusions and recommendations are presented
in Section IV:
3.3.1 Flammability
Flammability is the characteristic.of material to either burn with a flame
or rapidly oxidize as in an explosion. It is related to those materials which
are associated with the personal crew provisions and non-metallic materials of
the EMU.
The review of payload characteristics and flammability criteria indicate
that the EMU will not be susceptible to flammability due to external sources
of ignition (parag. 3.3.4 discusses electrical systems as sources of ignition).
In order to maintain flame propagation there must be a flame supporting oxidizer
and a surrounding pressure. Therefore, should the EMU be engulfed in an
oxidizer the lack of a surrounding pressure at the Shuttle orbiter altitude
will not support combustion.
Certain types of hypergols and pripellants (i.e., flouriness nitrous
oxides) have been known to ignite at pressure altitudes of about 90 kilometers
(300,000 feet) but it is not anticipated that these exotic materials will be
used due to the difficulty of handling and storage.
The critial area of concern is within the EMU itself. The suit will be
operating anywhere from 26 to 55 x 10 3 newtons/m2 (3.7 to 8 psi). Should a
two-gas system be used, 02/N2 mixture, its environment would be less susceptible
to flammability than pure 02 , In lower pressure suits 100 percent oxygen is used.
It becomes difficult to select material which is flame proof and yet comfortable
for the wearer. Therefore, any electrical system, both biomedical and the EMU
electrical system, must be designed and built such as not to become the ignition
source internally to the EMU or the portable life support system. Typical
requirements are defined.l
3-.3.2 Thermal Interface-Crew Protection
a
This interface consists of payload equipment external thermal conditions
which can occur from long duration space viewing (coolant), direct solar heat-
ing, and artificial -eating sources carried within the payload.
Natural Thermal Environment
The thermal dynamic range of the Shuttle orbiter bay is dependent on the 	 I
inclination, the altitude of flight, and the orbiter attitude. For example,
with an empty 'bay, ''earth pointing and belly toward earth the liner temperature
(Xo'= 760 to 919) will approach 1.15°K (-250°F). High temperatures are reached
at about 366°K (200°F) with the bay toward the sun and the X axis perpendicular
to the direction of solar flux (Xo = 1191 to 1307). Figure 3-9 illustrates
temperature ranges for the empty cargo bay under typical conditions.
`i
1MSC Design and Procedural Standard, JSC M-8080, Standard No 130
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1 -112.0 142.3 -216.5
2 -124.5 181.3 -249.7
3
- 82.1 172.5 -240.8
4 - 46.5 123.4 -217.0
Xo = 919 to 1191
1 _ '91.7 140.2 -164.9
2 -114.9 181.9 -21-1.7
3 - 78.0 173.7 -211.6
4 - 38.5 121.7 -164.7
Xo = 1191 to 1307
1 - 98.1 136.8 -164.5
2
-118.3 195.5
-228.8
3 - 88.9 190.7 -224.5
4 - 52.2 124.4 -160.0
Figure 3-9. Typical Orbiter Cargo Bay Empty Temperatures
	 OF
As a function of many variables, e.g.,, types of materials, coatings,
configuration, and. extraneous heat sources, a continuous transient temperature
determination of payloads would require extensive analysis Therefore, 	 i
simplifying assumptions were made as to specific conditions and payload
configurations, so as to analyze potential thermal interfaces._ The analysis
was performed to evaluate criteria l previously defined for EVA equipment
design:
The EMU shall Provide sufficient thermal insulation
to maintain .
	
contacts .	 . by an object with a surface
temperature between -180' and +200°F"
3
However, there may be instances where this becomes rather unsuitable for a
variety of activities using EVA, and may be too stringent a requirement to
impose on all payloads in a variety of operations.
The analysis was conducted to provide some insight in the prediction of
Shuttle payload hardware maximum surface temperatures to which the EMU could
be exposed in payload deplo yment EVA. Since the extensive effort required
for transient temperature' analyses was not within the scope of this study,
data were developed on equilibrium temperature as a function of the surface
solar absorptance to infrared emittance ratio (a
s 
/c) for four conditions of
general use,
1Request for Proposal No. 9-BC7- 4-6-1P, Space Shuttle Extravehicular Mobility
Unit, dated December 12,-1975, JSC.
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Figure 3-10 presents equilibrium temperatures based on a severe orbital
heating environment for typical hollow boom sections for three typical surface
finishes, stored vertically in the payload bay as shown. More severe heating
environments than that assumed are possible but their occurrence in actual
flights is unlikely. Two orbiter bay average temperatures, 339°K and 365°K
(150°F and 200°F) are plotted in the figure. The 365°K value is considered a
reasonable upper limit for the bay average temperature although localized areas
could be significantly higher. As the boom sections are placed in operational
position out of the orbiter bay, the temperature will drop toward the values
given in Figure 3-11
The equilibrium temperatures given in Figure 3-11 would be representative
of the space telescope or other retrieved spacecraft. As noted on the figure,
only circumferential average temperatures are given. However, they are a reason-
able representation. of actual temperatures provided that the surfaces are not
insulated from the telescope inner structure and the telescope inner surfaces
have a high emittance for good cross radiation. For those exterior surfaces
well insulated from the telescope structure (for example, the outer layer of a
multi-layer insulation blanket on the telescope), the maximum equilibrium
temperature would be near that obtained from Figure 3-12.
A maximum equilibrium temperature for deployed solar panels can be readily
obtained from Figure 3-12 provided the backface of the solar panels has an
emittance equal to the front face emittance. A solar_absorptance of 0.73 and
an infrared emittance of 0.78 is typical for a solar array_(as/e of 0.94) 	 As
explained in the note, of Figure 3-11, the solar panel temperature is obtained
by using one-half the solar panel as/6 ratio i.e., C.47, or about 322°K (120°F).
j
Figure 3-13 presents equilibrium temperatures for a small plate positioned
vertically in the lower portion of the orbiter bay as shown in the figure; both
sides of the plate are assumed radiating to the orbiter bay and space. If the 	 3
side of the plate not receiving solar heating is well insulated, that side could
be considered adiabatic and the plate equilibrium temperature for that condition
can be obtained by using an as /e ratio twice the actual value of the front face.
Maximum surface temperatures of zero power dissipation equipment boxes in the
orbiter bay are estimated to be within the temperature range defined by the two
conditions discussed. For example, if a box located in the lower portion of
the bay (components located higher in the bay generally will have lower equi-
librium temperatures) is painted with a white paint having an as/ s ratio of
0.4, the maximum surface temperature of the box could be expected to be in the
range 365°K to 389°K (200°F to 240°F) based on the information presented. One l
should be cautioned that this can be treated only as a guideline range; there
are some untypical but potential conditions where higher equilibrium tempera-
tures could occur.
On the cold end of the scale, reasonable minimum surface temperatures were
calculated from the data of Figure 3-9. Minimums and maximums (as discussed
above) for typical EVA tasks are listed on Table 3-7, with estimates of glove
grasping time. Lower temperatures than shown are possible but unlikely.
I
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Table 3-7. EVA Thermal Interfaces
--
EVA APPLICATIONS
TEMPERATURE (OF) GRASPINGDURATION
MIN:SECLOW HIGH
PRE-OPERATIONS
REMOVE CONTAMINATION SHIELDS -217 130/250 00:30
DISENGAGE BOOST LOCKS - 20 165 00:15
INSTALL -ERECT-EXTEND
Antennas - 20 165 02:45
Solar Arrays -120 115 02:00
Instrument & Booms -230 140/215 02:45/15:00
Sunshades -217 - 50 01:00/03:00
Mechanisms - 30 250 00:15/16:00
ENGAGE RMS - 20 165 00:15
LOAD A LM - 60 80 15:00
VISUAL INSPECTION - 20 -5/+310 00:45
REMOVE PYRO SHORTING PLUGS - 20 80/220 00:05
SEPARATE SPACECRAFT
REMOVE UMBILICAL - 60 200 00:30/02:00
DISENGAGE` SPACECRAFT -210 -5/310 00:30
D-OCKING	 OPERATIONS
RELEASE BOOST LOCKS -165 140 00:15
CONNECT UMBILICAL -210 180 00:30/02:00
PLANNED MAINTENANCE
INSTALL PROTECTIVE COVER/SAFETY STEMS -210 180 00:30
INSPECT SPACECRAFT -200 -60/200 00:45
ACCESS SPACECRAFT AND SPARES -140 60 01:45
REMOVE & REPLACE EQUIPMENT , - 25 200 20:00
CLEAN SENSORS - 80 138 00:05
REPAIR MECHANICAL ITEMS -230 -5/310 Undeterm.
PREPARE	 FOR	 RETURN
INSTALL CONTAMINATION SHIELDS -210 180 00:30
ENGAGE ENTRY LATCHES ` -164 140 00:15
REMOVE, _STOW & RETRACT
Antennas + 60 160 02:45
Solar Array -200 115 02:00
Instrument, and Booms -200 140/215 - 02:45/15:00
Sunshades - 80 130 01:00/03:00
Mechanisms -125 240- 00:15/16:00
ENGAGE-RMS	 - -217 146 00:15
RETRIEVE FILM - 60 80 15:00
-STOW/LOCK REMOVED COMPONENTS - 25 200 20:00
RETRIEVE SAMPLES - 25 410 05:00
INSPECT FOR ENTRY -200 -60/200 00:45
INSTALL SHORTING PLUGS - 25 80/220 00:05
l
i
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In general, thermal control coatings and protection systems will not
tolerate excessive handling since damage to these items could occur. Therefore,
anodized aluminum is a more likely EMU interface. Solar panels are subject
to damage upon direct contact; however, the temperature data given here would
conduct to the structured members. Potential payload damage is discussed
later. It is probable that built-in handholds or portable handles carried by
the EVA crewman would be used to move payload peripheral equipment. Handling
devices could be designed to eliminate the problem of very high or low touch
temperatures.
I	 The Global Positioning Satellite (CPS), NAVSTAR, thermal design indicates
surface temperatures iiithe range 144°K to 365°K (-200°F to +200°F) can be
expected. Skylab theraaal data indicates surface temperatures in the range of
89 0K to 422°K (-300°F to +300°F) may have been encountered during EVA.
(Skylab surface temperatures as high as 589°K (600°'F) were observed in the
area of the lost meteoroid shield but this was not an area of direct EVA.
i
Artificial Heat Sources
Temperature conditions are highly influenced by the size of the mass within
the payload bay; the heat generated by the various electronics internal to the
payload; and by the special heating requirements for sensitive equipment.. How-
ever, none of these sources are as thermally prodigious as the Radioisotope
Thermoelectric Generators (RTG's) presently being planned on several planetary
m	 missions.-
Specifically, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (Space Nuclear Systems
Division) has been actively pursuing a design of an RTC for the Mars/Jupiter/
Saturn program. The data presented herein was based on a Multi-Hundred Watt
RTG by GE. 1 The F-1 unit generating output power of 155 watts with an average
fin temperature of 530°K (482°F) (heat source average temperature of 1330'K [1932°F]), 	 i
Assuming that this unit would fly on deep space missions, the output
temperature must be dissipated by some type of heat rejection system until the
RTG is deployed allowing the heat to radiate to spare. EVA deployment using
the astronaut appears to be feasible from the standpoint of radiation (discussed
in another section) but direct handling presents EMU thermal design problems.
One solution is to design to a lower EMU maximum temperature andprovide
!
handling aids for such special cases.
I	
'.
r	 Summary
3
The temperatures given in Table 3-7 were used to select recommended design	 j
values for the EMU. Maximum (high) temperatures raned'from 228 to 483°K (-50
to 410°F) with a mean of 357°K standard deviation ^^-°K (183°F, S.D. 83°F).
Minimum (low) temperatures ranged from 128 to 290°K (-230 to 64'F) with a mean
of 190 °K, S.D. 49 0K (13.7 0 F, S.D. 88°F). In comparing the value of the standard
deviations to the EVA task temperature data, the selected temperature design
points should be low: 140°K (-200°F), High: 395°K (2500F).
1Multi-Hundred Watt Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator Program, LES 8/9 Program,
MJS ProgT•am;Bi-Monthly'Progress Report (Jana-Feb. 1975), by General Electric for
the AEC, Space Nuclear Systems Division
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3.3.3 Durability - Crew Protection
Durability is defined as the wear and serviceability capabilities required
of the suit while being worn by the crewman in performing payload-related
activities in the orbiter bay and space environment.
The payloads will be numerous and highly specialized and will be represen-
tative of a large spectrum of disciplines. The duties of the EVA crewman to
support these payloads may be extensive and diversified, and require exceptional
activities in close proximity with all types and conditions of the payload hard-
ware.
Durability or the resistance to wear becomes an important factor when one
considers the large and varied number of tasks which may be performed by EVA
in support of payloads. The real proof of durability lies in emperical data;
however, estimates were made to obtain the required durability data.
In the development of these data techniques developed by frank and Lillian
Gilbreth were used in part. Fundamentally, the technique consists of (1) collect-
ing and analyzing comparative data for the performance of various tasks, and
(2) selecting and synthesizing the task data. The logic of this approach has
been adapted by modern engineering and industrial practice and appears to be
a practical method for our purposes.
The primary payload related source of wear is flexing which is a function
of task performance. The wear rate is a function of crew suit time and of
body, and limb movements which become difficult to establish. Consequently, a
numerical extrapolation method was used to determine EMU operating cycles.
A range of EVA tasks for supporting the baseline payloads were identified
and are listed in Table 3-6. Body motions to perform each task were evaluated as
to each of 10 mobility parameters as illustrated previously in Figures 3-2 and
3-5. The number of motion cycles times the number of performances of the task
would equal the total number of cycles. Thus, where removal and stowage of
	 j
contamination covers was calculated to occur 2234 times, two hip/waist flexion
cycles were estimated: 2x2234 4468 cycles. Similar estimates were made for
the entire matrix of tasks/motions. These estimates are considered to be conser-
vative, and furthermore, do not include estimates of motion in preparation,
translation, etc. Table 3-8 presents a summary of the results. Rather than
present the total matrix of motions per tasks,- an average for the 36 tasks is
given. However, the sum of all the motion cycles times tasks are ;riven.
The EMU design will be required to perform a variety of unique movements
and it will be required to perform multiple repetitions of these movements.
The primary flexing of the MU occurs at the waist,' shoulders, hips, and in
the hand, wrist, and arm areas. Waist mobility is highly desirable to allow 	
3
the astronaut to see around blocked areas during EVA as well as to perform
tasks. The waist (hip and waist, side to ,side and rotation, and hip abduction)
must be substantially designed to withstand continual flexing in this area, over
300K cycles in compound movements.
a
3-20
SD 76-SA-0026
J4 '	 ..	 ..
aI
j
oi% 
Space Division
Rockwelllnternational
Other areas of substantial flexing are in the hips, shoulders, and knees.
Again, compound movements may require over 300 K cycles for total performance
in the "572 flight" schedule.
Table 3-8. EMU Flex Cycle Data
Type of Motion
Avg. No.
Motions/Task
Total
K-Cycles
Hip/waist flexion/extension 3.1 119
Waist mobility 'Left/right 5.6 218
Elbow flexion/extension 0.5 21
Forearm mobility wrist rotation 4.3 166
Shoulder abduction/adduction 0,4 16
Shoulder lateral - median movement 2.9 ill
Shoulder flexion/extension 1.7 67
Shoulder rotation down/up 3.2 124
Hip abduction leg straight 3.7 145
Knee flexion kneeling 0.4 16
Total number of performed tasks x payloads
	 9066
Space Division01% Rockwell International
3.3.4 Dielectric Properties - Crew Protection
The dielectric property as used here is defined as the electrical property
of material which in the event of physical contact with energized conductors
has a resultant transmissibility characteristic of infinite resistance.
Electrical systems in the orbiter, the Spacelab, and free-flying spacecraft
requiring crew interface during normal and contingency operations will be built
to strict standards. These include the selection of electrical conductors which
are non-flammable, or covered with non-flammable tubing or wire insulation
capable of handling and operating deformations. l These requirements do not
apply to material isolated by a container capable of retaining, within the
container, any combustion resulting from high currents.
It is unlikely during normal trouble-free operations that the EMU would
come into contact with the electrical configurations described above. 	 Wire
bundles and cables will be physically separate and isolated from flammable 1
liquids and gases; in addition, pyrotechnic wires will be removed from normal
function bundles to separate lines. 	 If any problem should occur, it will most
likely result during crew operating connectors, switches, and circuit breakers
or during some unscheduled repair.
Operational procedures such as making or breaking connectors, and activating
switches and circuit breakers will normally be performed with power off. 	 How-
ever, this procedure may not be totally precluded. 	 In the event that the power
is not removed or cannot be removed, contact of electrically hot pins with the
EMU must not occur such as to close the circuit.	 An example of such possibility
could occur in the EVA task of installing solar panels on a spacecraft. 	 It has
been found that any amount of light striking a solar panel will generate current.
j	 Normally switches are not incorporated between the panels and the spacecraft
buses to retain system reliability; therefore, solar panels are in effect
electrically active at all times. 	 EMU contacts across the solar panel connec-
tors will be required not	 to short the panel. 	 EVA repair of the Skylab micro-
wave radiometer antenna involving interspersed power-on checks, is another
e	 example of potential shortings.
Static charge buildup in the EMU's metallic and non-metallic material
{	 components is another area requiring substantial consideration. It is import--
ant in that both the EVA astronaut and the payload electronics are susceptible
to injury and possibly failure when a substantial voltage is applied to the
subject matter.j
i	 I
The present maximum safe shock levels for do and ac currents up to 2000 Hz
are specified as 1.0 microampere applied internally and 100 microampere applied
externally to the body. 2 	The sensation produced by an electric shock depends on
'	 the current density at the point of contact with the source. 	 It is the valuei
and frequency of the current, its duration and pathway through the body that is
I	 i	 mainly responsible for the damage.
f^
^JSC Design and Procedural Standard,,JSCM- 8080, No. 22 and 25
2JSC Design and Procedural' Standard, JSCM-80$0, No. 	 131
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The data in Figure 3-14 are estimates of physiological thresholds taken
from several studies l based on a 150-1b subject.
l
t
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Figure 3-14. Range of Physiological Effect of 60 Cycle
j,
Specific requirements cannot be stated other than in terms of crewman and
payload protection; i.e.,
1. EMU materials and construction shall not be such that electrical
potential or current from payload wiring, components, or static
buildup could be painful nor injurious to EVA crewmen.
2. EMU materials and construction shall be non-conductive in those
segments (e.g., forearms, chest) normally planned for interface
with payload components which may be damaged by inadvertent
shorting (dielectric test requirements).
3. EMU materials or design shall prevent static potential during
payload operations so as to preclude spark discharge.
1Compendium of Human Responses to the Aerospace Environment, Vol. I, NASA
CR-1205(1) prepared by Lovelace Foundation for Medical Education and Research,
November 1968.
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3.3.5 Radiation Resistance - Crew Protection
Radiation resistance is the ability of the E19J to protect the crewman from
the natural radiation such as the Van Allen Radiation Belt in the South Atlantic
anomaly and radioactivity such as the RTG in the Mariner Jupiter Orbiter (MJO)
payload. This radiation protection will be required during the performance of
EVA duties with and around the payloads in the orbiter payload bay and the
surrounding space environment. It will be achieved through the selection of
suit materials, suit design, and the possible addition of special auxiliary
over garments as necessary.
The following tables (3-9 and 3-10) provide information with respect to
radiation levels and dosage limits.
Table 3-9.
	
National Academy of Sciences Recommended
Dose Limits for Astronauts (Rads)
Bone Marrow
(5 cm depth)
Skin
(0.1 mm. depth)
Eyes
(3 mmdepth)
Testes
(3 cm depth)
1 year daily 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.1
average
30 days maximum 25.0 75.0 37.0 13.0
Quarterly maximum 35.0 105.0 52.0 18.0
Yearly maximum 75.0 225.0 112.0 38.0
Career maximum 400.0 1200.0 600.0 200.0
Table 3-10. Maximum Altitudes as Function of Shielding to Not
Exceed Annual Radiation Doses
Orbit
Inclination
Maximum Altitude (nmi)
-	 — Limiting
Organ0 gm/cm2 2 gm/cm2 5 gm/cm2
29 0 150 240 300 Eyes
60 0 110 220 280 Eyes
90 0 80 200 240 Eyes
The Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) system contains three
thermoelectric generators. This system will be assembled to the payload prior
to the payload being installed in the payload bay. The radiation levels of
the generators in this configuration will be asindicated in Table 3-11.
1
i
a
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Table 3-11. RTG Radiation Levels*
t
k
These values are for one gene-rator only. A side exposure of three	 -
generators would radiate three times the amount of radiation. An end
exposure to three generators would radiate a higher level of radiation
identified in the table for one generator, but a lesser level than that
of a side exposure to three generators.
i
3.3.5.1 Induced Radiation Requirements Analysis
Upon installation of the payload in the payload bay, a cooling jacket and
clam shell cover will be installed around the RTG generators. The exact
composition and construction of the cooling system and jacket materials are
undetermined at this time. However, the radiation intensities will be lower.
At the time of activation of the payload a planned EVA task is for the
	
crewmen to op r	clam shells and ,remove the cooling jackets, erect the pay-
load and extend the RTG' s. These tasks will require the crewmen to be in the
immediate proximity of these items in order to unlatch the latching mechanisms,
attach the manipulator arm, and accomplish the tasks as identified in Figure
3-15.
An evaluation of task time data from the "EVA" study indicates that the
crewman would be working at about 3 meters from the RTG for about 12 to 15
minutes. This would be followed by a translation to the RTG and removal of
the coolant jacket. The elapsed time before departing from the jacket would
be about 20 minutes. Distances for most of this time would include:
	
Body	 -	 0.3 to %1.0 m
	
Eyes	 -	 0.3 to ti1.0 m
	
Hands	 -	 0.04 to %0.5 m
(skin)
i
About 12additional minutes are required for translation and stowage of
the coolant jacket at about 3 meters distance. -Finally, 'about 15 minutes of
crew tasks are performed around the spacecraft at distances of 1.5 meters or
more. Total time within about 3 meters or less equals nearly one hour of
crew time.
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M
Typical Radiation Levels (mrad/hr)
F-2 RTG MWH Pu-238
0.04 270 640
1.0 12 18
2.0 4 5
3.0 2 2
EXTERIOR —^
WORK STATION
INTERIOR
WORK STATION-
l REMOVE RTG
COOLING JACKET
i
jrj
1
Rockwell International
Space Division
CONTAMIIJATION
SHIELD
{OPENED1
OUNLATCH AND OPEN
CONTAMINATION SHIELD	 /^
i
Figure 3-15. MJO Payload_EVA Operations
^	 3Using a conservative approach, would indicate the potential exposure to
the crewman:
Dosage in MRADS
One r94H Three MWH
Pu-238 Pu-238
Body 22 66
Eyes 25 75 -
_Hands/forearms 122 366
Using the worst case (3 M H units), the potential problem areas--eyes
would receive about 1/4 allowable daily dose, while skin areas could receive
up to 1/2 allowable daily dose. Figure 3-16 presents similar data in millirems.
-Since only about 20 payload deliveries in the payload model for 1980 through
L	 1991 would be likely to utilize the RTG,,there does not appear to be a major
design requirement. However, since contingency reinstallation of the coolant
	
-
jacket may be required, special purpose protective over gloves could be a
consideration. Also, eye protection, especially in connection with the natural
_environment as discussed below maybe a valid technology development.
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Figure 3-16. Permissible Astronaut Occupancy Periods
for 150 MREM Day Limit
3.3.5.2 Van Allen Ionizing Radiation Exposure Analysis
3
To establish potential radiation protection from the South Atlantic anomaly,
EVA task and mission operations data from the "EVA" study were examined. All	 i
missions in the study model were summarized as to EVA periods and durations,
and orbit altitudes and inclinations were totaled. For simplification, missions
were counted in one of 15 groups--three inclinations and five altitudes. Table
3-12 presents the mission distribution for all EVA missions,
Table 3-12. Summary Orbits/Altitudes with EVA
No. Flights With EVA
Nom. Inclination - Deg.
Nom. Alt.	 (km) 28.5 56 98
200 138 -	 11 19
400 65 56 36
600 23 2 24
800 --
-- 2
1000` -- -- 1
Total 231 69 82
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In consultation with Dr. James W. Haffner of Rockwell Space Division,
the thresholds for protection from electron and proton particle energy were
evaluated for an E11U shielding estimated at 0ti0.3 gm/cm2 .	 At this level, the
thresholds of concern would be `L0.5 MeV of electrons and 15 MeV of protons
as shown in Figure 3-17.
	
Maps of the Van Allen belt flux were selected for
j	 >0.5 MeV electrons and >15 MeV protons for the five altitude levels given.
Figures 3-18 and 3-19 respectively, illustrate proton and electron contours
for flux density per square centimeter per second.	 Figure 3-19 also illustrates
orbit traces of_a 98-degree inclination WTR launch through northern and4
southern electron flux as well as the South Atlantic anomaly. 	 Figure 3-20
j	 shows typical ground traces from all three selected inclinations at a 600-kra
altitude.
I
Using Figure 3-19 as an example to illustrate the 24th through 31st
revolutions, the worst exposure occurs on the descending node of revolutions
27, 28, and 29, at a flux density of up to 105 particles/cm2/sec. 	 Planned
EVA for HEO missions indicates that the second available EVA period would
j	 start concurrently with the descending aode of the 27th revolution (equator
crossing) at a mission GET of 42 hours.	 In this specific case, the EVA
crewman would be exposed to about 45 immutes at an electron flux level of 104
and about 40 minutes at 105 during a six-hour EVA.
Converting these to rads
a
3 x 10_
8
 x FLUXE _ 3 x 10 4	rads for 45 min = 0.81 rads
sec
3 x 10-	rads for 40 min _ 7.20 rads
sec
The equivalent daily dose attributed to this oneEVA period would be 8 rads
due to electron flux only, at an equivalent of 0.3 gm/cm2 for the EMU.
Using flux density maps for radiation at the specified particle energy,
and for each selected altitude, EVA exposures were calculated for five altitudes
	 a
and three inclinations as listed in Table 3-12.
The exposure data were calculated by taking mission evert timelines and
plotting planned 6-hour EVA periods as they could occur with respect to
orbital traces for each of the 15 orbits.	 A summary of the results is pre-
sented in Table 3-13. 	 It should be noted that sel-ction of mission events,
and consequently of EVA start and stop periods, was based on Shuttle reference
missions.
	
Therefore, it is a point evaluation neither optimized to avoid
S.A.A. nor worst case. 	 Consequently, variations plus or minus the indicated
dosage could occur.	 However, the data do define 'levels of exposure which
can realistically be encountered if EVA is routinely available for payload
operations.
Examination of the data in the Table indicates that about 44 percent
of the missions would expose the crewman to about 2 rads or less. However,
to accomplish about 90 percent of the missions, the crewman could receive
about 6 rads or less per 6•-hour EVA, or 18 rads during 3 EVA's.
	
(While the
nominal EVA duration was determined to be about ,3 hours, a 6-hour EVA would
l
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i
represent a more conservative design value). By comparison, data from Skylab
j	 (50-degrees, 435 km orbit) were somewhat less- 3.6 rem/6-hrs of EVA for the
worst dosage (3.6 rem - 3.6 rad for primarily electron exposure).
Selecting a design-to-radiation dose is dependent on a variety of factors-
number of flights per year or per quarter, exposures due to other operations
than EVA, etc. Skylab information indicates about: 0.1 rad/day or less for
cabin radiation levels, or well within allowable levels. However, if EVA
is not to be constrained by S.A.A. passage, it would appear that protection from
dosages of 18 to 20 rads for multiple EVA's or 25 rads for single EVA's
should be considered - about 1/3 the allowable 30-day dose,
To determine shield thickness required for improved radiation protection,
refer to Figure 3-21. Taking a given radiation dose as unity, increased,,
shield requirements can be calculated for allowable dose. Thus, for the example
given, to reduce the 18.4 rads by one-half, first determine rads due to electrons
and protons--in this case 18.3 and 0.06 respectively. Taking 18.3 as unity on
the graph (1.0 radiation dose) 50 percent would be read at 0.5 of the dose, or,
about 0.35 gm /cm2 . At this level, the dosage due to electrons would drop to
	 i
9.15 rads and due to protons 0.05 rads (i.e., 0.91 dose x proton dose rate).
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Similarly, selecting a shielding thickness of 0.4 gm/cm 2
 would result in
reduction to 28 percent of exposure due to electrons and 0.81 percent due to
protons. For the case of 22.6 rads the result would be:
0.28 x 21.38 = 5.99 radsE
0.81 x 1.22 = 0.99 radsp
6.88 total rads
or about 30 percent of the original dosage.
The analysis shows that technology research is required to 'determine EMU
shielding capabilities, and to perform further analyses of the required protection.
3.3.6 Penetration, Abrasion Resistance Crew Protection
Penetration, abrasion resistance is defined to mean the ability of the
external surface of the EMU suit to resist penetration or abrasions by physical
contact with the surfaces of the payloads, payload bay, and associated structures
and hardware while the crewman is performing his activities.
'i
The sub-elements from which the suit design must provide penetration,
abrasion resistance are: sharp edges, sharp corners, protrusions, fasteners
(bolt heads, nuts, cotter keys, safety wires), plumbing, wiring, structures.
Certain payload optics incorporate light baffles in their internal mechanisms
which commonly have extremely sharp edges. If the optical shutters become
jammed or inoperative, EVA might be employed to free them. This task could
'	 consist of reaching inside the barrel of the instrument past the sharp edges of
athe sun shields znd manually freeing the shutters.
	 a
The EMU suit will be worn by the crewman while he is performing tasks
both inside and outside of the payload bay relative to payload support activities.
The crewman will be coming into physical contact with the structural surfaces of
the payload bay and the payloads. The finishing processes of these contact
surfaces will be governed by multi-organizational responsibilities. These 	 !
responsibilities and the specific finish requirement specifications vary with
r
	
	
organizational responsibility. On previous projects where EVA interface was 	 j
limited to only a few spacecraft ,(Apollo CSM, LEM, OWS, or ATM) the approach
selected was to require rounded or chamfered edges and corners, and to ensure
that there were no exposed bolt threads, burrs, etc. With hundreds of space-
craft and sortie experiments being planned or developed, it might be more
reasonable to ensure EMU protection against worst case situations. In evaluating
various design_ criteria, Table 3-14 shows that significant differences may not
exist between manned and unmanned spacecraft standards. The chart shows
selected sources of design criteria from procuring agencies and contractors as
they are likely to apply to payloads. The data suggest that EMU designs `should
tolerate at least the 0.038 -cm radius (0.015-inch) for spacecraft as being the
sharpest identified. While random burrs or screw heads are more difficult to
define, a technology investigation of material resistance would appear to be
indicated. This is especially important in view of the Skylab' experience
which indicates EVA may become necessary for a wide variety of structures and
equipments. Glove protection for the crewman's fingers may be especially
important in view of Skylab experience.
_i
i
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Table 3-14. Edge Radius Criteria
EVA CRITERIA STANDARD DESIGN CRITERIA
APPLICATION(EDGE AND IN-PLANE SPACECRAFT
-	 JSC (1)'^ MSFC (2)CORNER RADII) EMU DESIGN (3) OVERALLSHUTTLE (4) CARGOBAY (5) UNMANNEDSPACECRAFT (6)
OPENINGS, PANELS, COVERS 0. 64 cm (0.25) 0.6cm (0.23) 0. 025 cm. (0.01) 0.97 cm (0.38) 0.64cm (0.25) 0.6 cm (0.25)
or Guod(CORNER RADII IN PLANE OF PANEL	 - 0.31 cm (0.13)
EXPOSED SHEET METAL EDGES	 FLANGES, 0.15. cm. (0.06) 0.15 cm (0.06) 0.025 cm (0.01) 0.038 to 0.076 cm 0.64cm (0.25) 0.038 to 0.076 cm.
LATCHES, .CONTROLS, HINGE, SMALL (0.015 to 0.03) (0.015: to 0.03)
HARDWARE OPERATED BY THE PRESSURIZED
GLOVED HAND
SMALL PROTRUSIONS. (LESS THAN APPROXIMATELY 0. 15 cm. (0. G6) NOT NOT NOT NOT NOT
0.48 cm(0.19)	 - AVAILABLE AVAILABLE AVAILABLE AVAILABLE
* NOTE; A450 CHAMFER X0.15 cm (0.06") (MINIMUM) WITH SMOOTH BROKEN EDGES IS ALSO ACCEPTABLE IN PLACE OF A CORNER RADIUS,
THE WIDTH OF CHAMFER SHOULD BE SELECTED APPROX. THE RADIUS CORNER DESCRIBED ABOVE.. 	 -
(1) .JSC-10615-SHUTTLE EVA DESCRIPTION & DESIGN CRITERIA -
(2) MSFC STD 512 = STANDARD MAN/SYSTEM DESIGN. CRITERIA FOR MANNED ORBITING PAYLOADS --	 -	
-
(3)	 EMU RFP.
(4) ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL SPEC. MA0103-304 - MACHINED PARTS-TOLERANCES 	 -
(5) GENERAL DYNAMICS/ASTRONAUTICS SPEC NO. 0-70902 -.MANUFACTURING STANDARDS
(6) . GPS, ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL SPEC, MA0102-002, STANDARD DETAILS FOR METAL SHEET, PLATE, EXTRUSIONS, AND REINFORCED PLASTIC
LAMINATES
4
E
3.3.7	 Fluid Resistance - Crew Protection
Fluid resistance is the ability of the external material of the EMU to
resist penetration or physical or chemical reactions when subject to contact
or close proximity with fluids (liquids and gases) or chemicals.
Duties and activities related to and in support of the following payloads
will require possible exposure of the crewman to the identified hazards:
' Payload	 Typical Fluids
Atmospherics, Magnetospherics and	 GN2, LN2, N2H4	 1
Plasmas in Space (AMPS)	 (Hydrazine) , H2O
Mariner Jupiter Orbiter (MJO)	 GN2, MMH(CH2NHNH2)N204
N2H4 (Hydrazine),
i The effects of these fluids on a suited crewman have been evaluated as follows.
I
H2O - Water.	 Escaping H2O would cause a film of ice or frost.	 The ice
would reducethe mobility and flexibility of the suit. 	 Iir the H2O r_ontacted
the visor it would reduce the visibility.	 However, it is believed that the
icing temperatures would not be low enough to permanently damage the existing'
state-of-the-art suit and visor material.
1
N204 - Nitrogen Tetroxide. -	 This oxidizer is toxic and very reactive.
f While Apollo/Skylab	 materials would probably not have been affected by N204,
any future EMU materials must be carefully evaluated.,
I
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NA - Monopropellant Hydrazine.	 This fuel is toxic, flammable, and
caustic.	 It is unsuitable for use with various, materials; therefore, EMU
selection must be carefully evaluated.
CH2NHNH2/N2H4 - MonomethyZ Hydrazine/Hydrazine.	 This fuel is toxic,
volatile, and reactive with CO2 and 02.	 Suit damage may occur. 	 Droplets could
have a wetting effect on the visor which would cause temporary reduced vision.
LN21GN2 - Liquid Nitrogen/Nitrogen.	 A large rupture or rapid escape of
GN2 could cause a rapid temperature lowering to as much as 144°K (-200°F) (if
equipment was already at a comparatively low temperature), 	 LN2 boiling point
is 78 °K (-3210 F).	 These temperatures could cause brittleness and cracking of
the suit material due to differential contraction.
Crewman activities in support of the above-identified elements will require
development.	 Testing of suit materials under exposure to the above identified
elements is recommended to establish the selection of the required suit materials.
3.3.8	 Impact Resistance - Grew Protection
Impact resistance is the ability of_'the EMU, suit, helmet, and life
support system,; to resist intentional and non-intentional rapid applications
of force against sharp objects.
t
The normal usage of the EMU does not plan for intentional impact; however,
{ some force applications may be required with the gloved hand. 	 Whether a gloved
hand is used to apply a sharp force or a tool held by the EVA astronaut, impact
forces traversing either through the arm or the suit should not be allowed to
cause damage to any portion of the suit.	 This is critical to mechanical joints;
G	 !
couplings (glove to arm), and the portable life support system.
i
,. Unintentional impact presents a problem during; translation or movement
made in a direction outside the field of vision.
	 The EMU is substantially more
bulky than normal clothing and as a-result it becomes difficult to precisely
position one's self to pass through tight areas.
	
Movement through the orbiter
t bay is not anticipated to be rapid; therefore, impact upon flat surfaces most
likely will not cause damage to the EMU. 	 Impact upon sharp surfaces, such as
corners and edges, can become a serious factor due to the single point of force
concentration on the EMU.
Thecritical
s (ie otype.	 The^ joint areas having moving parts (i. ., 	 elbow, knee) will
require protection from permanent deformation which will result in restriction
l of movement.	 The torso frontal area most likely will not need special protection
F since that area is within the astronaut's field of forward vision. 	 The portable
life support unit if mounted on the astronaut's back will most likely be sub-
jected to the greatest number of encounters, with the helmet also being subject
to impact in some cases.
K
F
i 3-35
SD 76-SA-0026
;, i
1t
	 ^	 y
` Space Division
„Rockwell international
Estimates of crew translation rates are in the order of 1 to 1_5 meters
per second (%3 to'V5
	
feet per second) .	 Considering the mass of the suited
crewman, forces in the order of 2224 N (500 lb) could be expected. 	 If an
exposed corner were encountered, with a radius of about 0.64 cm (0.25 in.),
the pressure could reach 5500 N/cm2 (8000 psi).
3.3.9	 Bio Contamination -- Crew Protection
Biological contamination is any form of living matter that may attach to
the EMU threatening crew health.	 In addition to the crewmen, and the orbiter
environment, the most probable sources of such contamination will be the various
biological experiment payloads mounted in modules within the orbiter or cargo	 s
;j bay.	 The Space Processing discipline has a number of biological investigations
mounted in separate modules.	 Life sciences modules contain various organisms
E with the potential for bio-contamination. 	 All of these units will have their
own environmental control system; however, it is anticipated that some module
gas leakage will occur. 	 Bio contaminates such as bacteria and other micro-
organisms appproach the size of particulates and may escape from the pressurized
modules along with gas leakage.
These microorganisms are relatively hardy and seem to survive wide variations
in conditions.	 In the proper environment they have the ability to rapidly re=
produce.	 Therefore, should an EMU attract any microorganism and bring them
! back into the orbiter environment, rapid reproduction could take place. 	 In
Rany environment a number of microorganisms will exist; for example, clean air
2.8 to 28/cm3 (l to 10/cuft),_stratosphere 'U2 to 0.02/cm 3 (<l to 10_3/cu ft),,
F' human skin 1.35 to 13.5 E05/m2 (1 to 10 E04/sq in.).^ 3
'. Microbiological samples from Skylab indicate significant buildup and
distribution of certain organisms.	 In particular, the EMU was found to have
I,
mycological samples, with visible fungal growth on a liquid cooling garment. 	 I
Introduction of pathogenic microorganisms which may have a deleterious
-effect on the flight crew will require the EMU to be resistant to such contain-
ination.	 The EMU RFP has established requirements for control of bacteria and
fungus growth, and defined suit drying as a control over bacteria. 	 In addition,
material selection may be a necessary requirement or an alternative to various
external control techniques.	 Since the actual amount of biological contamination
: is difficult to predict due to the unknown types and quantity that might adhere 	 3
` to the EMU, further research and laboratory tests appears to be in order.
^
aa
s^
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3.3.10 Crew Reaction Time - Crew Performance
Crew reaction time is limited to EVA preparation (i.e., the donning and
doffing of the EMU for normal EVA operations, scheduled and non-scheduled
maintenanr.e, and for contingencies) and includes suit-up time, prebreathing
time, and airlock operations.
Crew reaction time is highly dependent upon the operating pressure within
the EMU.	 Several pressure levels have been considered in the past and for
'l. future space flight. 	 The Apollo A71, series operated at 26 x 103 N/m 2 (3.7 psi),
from a cabin pressure of 34 x 103 N/m 2 (5 psi).	 The current Shuttle orbiter
baseline plans are to provide an EMU at 28 x 10 3 N/m2 (4 psi).	 Since the orbiter
cabin is pressurized to 100 x 10 3 N/m2 (14.7, psi)	 (sea level),_ the use of
suits at these low pressures requires a period of time to beset aside for de-
nitrogenization of the EVA astronauts. 	 Any egress into space via an EMU
operating below 55 x 10 3 N/m2 (8 psi) will bring on the condition often
referred to as the "bends"
Figure 3-22 compares the preparation time requirements between an 8 psi
and a 3.7 psi spacesuit, prior to egress from the orbiter airlock and entry to
the orbiter payload bay. 	 The use of the 8 psi suit is estimated conservatively
to require about 1.5 hours of preparation time compared with approximately 3.5
hours for the lower pressure garment for routine operations. 	 The major influencing
factor is that of the oxygen prebreathing required for approximately 2 hours a
^ prior to EVA equipment 	 re aration	 suit donning, final equipment  checkout 	 andPp p ,,	  
the airlock operations.	 It should be noted that certain other_crew activities
can be performed during the early prebreathing period by use of portable
oxygen masks.
TIME-HOURS
T-4	 — 3	 —2	 -I	 0
f	 I	 I	 I
HESS
PRE-BREATHE* 	i
DON MASKS 6 CONTINUE MISSION TASKS -
a,
28 x 103 N/M 2 PREPARE EQUIPMENT
(4 PSI EMU)	
-
a_=
DON EMU
' PURGE b C/0
* INTERRUPTION IN PRE-BREATHING 'WILL RESULT IN
INTEGRITY CHECK
 INCREASED TIME IN NITROGEN DENITROGENIZATION
AIRLOCK OPS
ut
f
i
` PREPARE EQUIPMENT
55 x 103
 N/M2 DON EMU(8 PSI EMU)
PURGE b CIO
INTEGRITY CHECK
Figure 3-22.	 EVA Preparation 111 me -Typical	 AIRLOCK OPS
Routine Timelines
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Results of previous studies indicate that operation at 8 psia will improve
operations and/or substantial cost savings could be attributed to quick reaction;
e.g., increased experiment time in an EVA mode.
It appears that a rapid reaction time could best be used in support of
time-critical contingencies. In the referenced "EVA" study, historical data
concerning failures were analyzed. Table 3-15 summarizes time critical conse-
quences with respect to those systems that are affected and which could poten-
tially be corrected within a degrading time period.
Table 3-15. Matrix of Time-Critical Consequences
TIME CFITICAL CONSEQUENCES
LOSS OF LOSS OF LAUNCH GNDARK THERMAL
AFFECTED SYSTEMS PROBLEMS CONSUM SPECIMEN WINDOW TARGET CONDITION
FLUID FLUIDS LOSS I i
SYSTEMS v ^I
STRUCTURES b KINEMATICS J J ,IMECHANICS FAILURE
ELECTRICAL
SYSTEM
OFF-NOMINAL
CONTROLS & FAILED
DISPLAYS INDICATORS/CONTROL
DEPLOYMENT. f
INTERFACES ENGAGEMENT/ r
DISENGAGEMENT
r
	
	
Based on the number of anomalies analyzed from historical data which re-
sulted in time-critical consequences, percentages of total payload deliveries
were calculated and _applied to Shuttle payloads. A screening of the Shuttle
payloads was made so that the percentage would only be applied to those payloads
with a-potential for the defined time-critical consequence (i.e., only payloads
j	 with biospecimens could have a potential loss of ,specimens). Further screening'
i	 eliminated, where feasible, anomalies where EVA response was precluded (i.e.,
it	 automated spacecraft "missed targets" will only occur during autonomous opera- I
tions). Other categories were considered on the basis of occurring anytime
during a mission. 'Thus, for the automated spacecraft which might suffer loss
of consumables only a"small percentage may occur during the delivery phase
where EVA response is possible. The sum of all time-critical anomalies is
about 15 percent of the total calculated number of potential anomalies.
s	 3-38	 _
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LOSS OF, LOSS OF MISSED MISSED THERMAL TOTAL
CONSUM-^ SPECIMENS LAUNCH TARGET ANOMALY BASE
TYPE OF DATA ABLES WINDOW
PRC DATA
NO.	 ANOMALIES 22 8 75 144 27 525
RATE/86 -PL'S 0.26 0.09 0.87 1.67 0.31 6.1
SHUTTLE DATA
NO.
	
POSSIBLE
PAYLOADS
NASA AUTO S/C 255 24 152 - 255 261
NASA SORTIE 230 39_ - 36 181 235
TOTAL 485 63 152 36
436 496
EQU I V° PAYLOAD
NASA 122 6 132 60 135 3026
DOD 39 0 78 - 47 -
NON-NASA
10 1 - 6 9 -SORTIE
1	 _
4	 a
t
Rr^ckwel l International1 Space Division
1
The results are listed in Table 3-16. The numbers on the row labeled PRC data
are based on examination of the historical source. Thus, 26 percent of the
spacecraft were determined to have suffered loss of consumables due to anomalies.
Since 255 automated spacecraft and 230 sortie payloads in the traffic model
require fluid consumables, it was predicted that 26 percent (or 122 total) of
the traffic model payloads could exhibit the same failure. These numbers are 	 q
entered on the line labeled "NASA" under the heading "Equivalent Payload".
DOD and Nor,-NASA Sortie Equivalent Payloads were calculated on the basis of the
number of flights only since payload details were not available.
Table 3-16. Potential Payload Time-Critical Anomalies
€1
I,6
,
Only a qualitative evaluation can be made relative to the requirement for
a 8 psi suit versus 4 psi.	 The 8 psi suit could improve operational efficiency
and reaction time by elimination of prebreathing, and potentially improve crew
operations by reduced prebreathing requirements.
	 Crew safety may be enhanced,
both due to increased protection from bends if a more rapid EVA contingency
I response became necessary, and b
	 providing ay 	 	 greater margin in time and partial-
pressure of 02 if EMU pressure drop should occur." Current technology developments
I for a 8 psi 'system are projected to equal or exceed mobility capability of pre-
vious technology 5 psi systems. 	 Other considerations include technology risk
and development costs in comparison to the baseline Shuttle EMU.
	 Comparative	 1
cost analyses are required for 8 psi qualification versus cost benefits from
ff
I
reduced EVA response time.
_i
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3.3.11 External Interface - Crew Performance
External interfaces as defined here refer to auxiliary devices, load
bearing points and provisions for attachment of tools to the EMU, all of which
enhance EVA crew performance.
It is anticipated that the EMU will be required to provide additional inter-
facing beyond that of providing _a livable environment for the EVA astronaut.
The ideal design of an EMU would be to keep it as simple as possible and free
from any functional requirements other than to provide the proper environment.
1
	
	 However, thl astronaut will be re quired to move about, the orbiter bay and the
payload equipment.. During the EVA he must prepare equipment and deploy or
assist in the deployment of mechanical devices. In most cases, the payloads
will be designed such as not to require the assistanceof special tools. How-
ever, during normal maintenance and contingency operations it is highly probable
that various types of mechanical aids will be required. A problem may occur
while the astronaut is translating about th 4^ bay with tools or a tool kit. The
problem is multiplied when multiple tools are required to be used interchange-
ably. It is impractical to return each tool to a kit, and the tool cannot be
allowed to float in space. One solution is to attach the tool(s) via lanyard(s)
to appropriate loops conveniently located about theEMU. Either the interface
must be sufficiently reinforced or the attachment must breakaway such that a
mass of 5.7 kg (12.5 lbm) (i.e., astronaut in an EMU) moving about catching the
tool will not damage the EMU.,
p
	
	
In addition to the above requirement the EVA astronaut is required to be
firmly restrained to be able to react forces Several methods or combination
of methods may be used. He may require that only his feet be secured or he
may require the aid of waist lanyards or a combination of these. In the past
foot cleats have been used as have "Dutch shoe" platforms. There are a sub-
,=
	
	
stantial number of tasks which require only his feet be secured while per-	 9
forming these tasks; however, provisions should be made for additional load
E	 bearing points for force reaction.
Some consideration has been given to providing °a built-in capability in
the EMU to accept various tools and also to integrate a universal tool as part
of the suit. A review of the various payload requirements quickly eliminated
the integrated suit/tool requirement while the built-in capability to accept'
various tools appears to have merit but it also adds complexity and constraints
which are undesirable in a univ ,::rsal EMU. The major difficulty lies in the
payload definition and requirements which in many cases have yet to be defined
t to a, point of confirming requirements. Also, providing a dedicated portion of
the suit to a specific or general interface with a;tool will generally limit'
E	 the EMU as opposed to making it more versatile.
It is expected that many payloads in certain configurations are so closely
packaged that the EVA astronaut moving about will be required to push about at
various points on the EMU. These various areas of 'force application will
require that the EMU be capable to accept these forces without permanent de- 	 +
#	
formation or damage and in any event, shall not endanger the EVA astronaut.
i
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Evaluation of EVA tasks shows that reactions of force application occur
most frequently with the knees, shoes, waist, and gloves. Without question,
the gloves will receive considerable use in the area of force application
consisting of pushing, sequeezing and torquing forces. Based on previous EVA's
the majority of tasks will also involve a foot restraint. The shoulders,
elbows, and knees will in all cases be subjected to a direct pushing force.
An evaluation was conducted of vr;rious EVA tasks where the EMU may expect
greater than normal pressures to be exerted upon it. These are summarized in
Table 3-17. Figure 3-23 depicts the various tasks from "EVA" study design
concepts.
Table 3-17. EMU Estimated Contact Forces and Locations
Figure
No_.
3-22 Task Type Point of Force Application
Force
21 (lbs)
A Antenna Replacement Waist Attachment* 178	 (40)
B Antenna Deployment Waist Attachment 160	 (36)
C Unlock Boost Latches Gloved Hand* 110	 (25)
D Sensor Boom Placement Gloved Hand & Foot Attachment 150 (34)
D Electrical Umbilical Disconnect Gloves '& Knees 160 (36)
D Payload Booster Propellant Line Gloves & Knees 125	 (28)
Disconnect
E Solar Panel Installation Waist Front* 178 (40)
F, Payload Boost Cover Removal Front of Knees 160 (36)
G 5-M Tubular Boom Installation Shoulders* 110 (25)
H Sunshade (Flat-Type) Deployment Knees (Front/Back), Shins* 60 (13)
1 Sunshade (Circular) Deployment Waist & foot attachment 80	 (18)
J Sensor Cover Removal Lower Leg Front (Shins) & 20	 (5)
(Subsatellite) Front Breast Area*
K Large Antenna Deployment Elbows, Knees (Front), 150 (30)
` via Multiple-Tube Booms Waist Front*
L Instrument Pointing Waist, Knees	 (Front), Gloves 80	 (18)
System Attachment
M Large Antenna'Swingout Back of Knee* 200	 (45)
Deployment
* Also foot restraint
3.3.12 Mobility Crew Performance
For this application the terms `mobility", "flexibility", "dexterity".,
and "wearability' *  are all closely related and all. equate to the degree of ease
(freedom of action), and efficiency that the suit allows the crewman to perform
his payload support activities.
"Flexibility ` relates to the :element of suit pliability, and the stiffness
of the suit materials. -"Mobility" relates to the same general criteria but
denotes the additional ability t, shift or move from one position to another,
and the amounts of crewman torque or effort required to overcome pressurization
factors. `Dexterity" more specifically relates to the ease and efficiency
which the glove allows for the accomplishment of manual tasks with the least
amount of restricted or lost motion during the performance of the task.
"Wearability" relates to the elements of fit and comfort of the suit to the
crewman. The wearability element becomes increasingly more important as the
payload crewmanactivities become more extensive, complicated, and of longer
durations.
Based on an evaluation of payload operations the EMU shall be designed to
provide for bending and centers of rotation of the mobility joints to closely
approximate the _natural body joint movements. This shall include the shoulder,
waist, hip, knee, ankle, elbow, wrist, and hand systems which allow the crewman
freedom of movement in the pressurized modes. The total EMU system design
shall permit the crewman to maintain a natural body position and a variety of
work positions without excessive force and to perform complex mobility functions.
Various payload requirements for mobility are illustrated in Figure 3-23.
Glove Dexterity. The space suit EV gloves have been defined in the Shuttle
EMU R:FP as requiring emphasis in the following areas:
Hand protection from the extreme thermal conditions in space
Crewman capability to wear pressurized gloves for periods of
7 hours without discomfort
Crewman capability to grasp tools, handholds, and similar
interfaces for extended periods (5 minutes) without fatigue
Providing complete freedom from pressure points on the hand
Elimination of material bulk and _location of seams for improved
dexterity
F i No additional payload-derived requirements were identified in this study.
Emphasis to glove mobility importance resulted from Skylab operations and
astronaut reports on limitations imposed by their EV gloves.
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Figure 3-23. Mobility - Crew Performance (l of 3)
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3.3.13	 Visibility/Orientation -• Crew Performance
Visibility/orientation is the ability of the EMU helmet to provide the
crewman with adequate powers ofobservation and orientation to allow him to
perform his payload support activities in and around the payload bay. 	 The
following characteristics are applicable to the optical characteristics of the
EMU helmet:	 (1) head mobility, (2) window size and viewing angle of helmet,
and (3) optical characteristics of visor assembly.
The payloads will be numerous and diversified. 	 The related crewman support
functions will also be numerous, extensive, and complicated, and may require
functional and calibration adjustments. 	 These activities will require precise
and delicate EMU optical visibility and orientation. 	 The payload support func-
tions may be accomplished by individual crewman activities or with crewmen
working in combinations with each other.	 In addition to the above identified
payload support requirements and crewman activities, it will be necessary for
i' the crewmen to be able to visually observe the progress of each other at
various distances during the performance of related activities.
The surfaces of the payloads (and the orbiter) will have various types of
finishes including white paint and anodized aluminum.
	 It will-be-necessary for
the visor to provide crewman protection from light intensities reflected from
these surfaces as follows:	
s
r^ Material	 Reflectance
` Cargo bay liner, teflon impregnated glass fabric
	 85 to 90%
ST and othera loads	 S13G whiteP Y	 ^	 Paint	 85%
I ST outer coating - silver-coated teflon
	 95%
I
Orbiter radiators 	 90% (96 to 100%
I
specular)
Of additional concern is the crewman's ability to evaluate his body po-,i-
tion and equipment with respect to the payload.
	 A particular problem may
1 relate to body orientation with respect to the life support backpack.
	 Although
current design concepts are for a unit smaller than Apollo, the crewman has
little or no visibility of the assembly, and must rely on a sense of its bulk.
i Supporting research should be employed to determinethe scope of the problem.
and potential design solutions such as "cat whiskers" or relocation of life
support components to more visible areas, etc.,, It is recommended that simula-
ti.ons be conducted in a backpack mode, and, if orientation problems are encoun-
tered, that packaging design and location (e.g., to front or side areas) be
investigated.	 Skylab data have indicated, problems of body orientation,
especially in viewing the feet during EVA's.
s
Shuttle EMU RFP requirements provide optical characteristics definition
	 {
j which appears to be adequate for all 'payload/EVA tasks identified in this study
in regard to helmet optical requirements; therefore, viewing with respect to
	
k
I, body orientation is the pertinent requirements area.
r
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J	 3.3.14 Communications--Crew Performance
Communications relates to the capability of the crewmen to be able to
communicate with the orbiter and for each crewman to be able to communicate
with each other while performing EVA tasks.
1I The extravehicular communications system (EVCS) is planned to provide
	
I	
communication and EKG, telemetry capability. The hardline capability will be
	
i	 voice only and is provided.by EMU umbilical connection to the PLSS during pre-
and post-EVA operations.
h
	
{	 During the operational phases certain instruments such as the side looking
radar in the ATL payload will be radiating high level energy. This system will
have a nominal power level of 50 to 100 watts (5 kw peak) in the X-band (3 cm wave
length). The transmission will be IF. If EVA activity is to be accomplished
during the operational cycle of the side looking radar, it will be necessary
to incorporate two IF-type band stop filters into the EMU communications system
to prevent blockage or saturation of the EMU communications.
Certain orbiter systems such as the rendezvous radar system will radiate
sufficient energy during its operational cycle to block or saturate the EMU
communications system. This system has a 2-degree beam width and will radiate
at an average power level of 40 watts in the Ku-band (2 cm wavelength). The
	
f	 signal level will be in the order of 200 milliwatts and will emanate in all 	 I
	
'i	directions. If EVA activity is to be accomplished during the operation of this
system, it will be necessary to provide the EMU communications system with the
following special protection to prevent blockage or saturation of the EMU
communications:	 1
1. A 'true trap” filter to absorb external RF energy transmission
2. Special shielding to the EMU amplifier circuits to
suppress stray pick up
Structural signal masking or blockage due to working in and around payloads
would be minimal in wavelengths of 3 to 20 cm. However signal masking or
blockage could be expected in wavelengths of 25 to 50 cm.
3.3.15 Operating Time - Crew Performance	 1
i	 q
Operating time refers to the amount of time an EVA astronaut is required
to be suited and performing EVA tasks.
EMU operating time is generally not related to the suit capability but
rather is a function of payload tasks. Estimates for planned EVA operations
such as preparation of payloads for operation, general maintenance, and	 j
preparation of payloads for entry, have been well within the present state-of-
the-art capability. For example, several of the lunar exploration missions
exceeded 7 hours, similarly Skylab EVA's were over 6 hours in some instances.
_A review of Shuttle payloads indicates that a minority could require EVA in
excess of 8 hours(viz. Space Telescope), or alternatively,; these payloads can
f	 be satisfied by multiple shorter duration EVA periods. Figure 3-24 presents
I_	
QRIG^V	 -.LL,OF ^R PAGE
__ 
	
QTT	 3-47
Y . SD 76-SA-0026--
t
^	 T	 ^
oi% Space Division
Rockwell International
a graphical summary of mission EVA times from the previous "EVA" study. The
purpose of the chart is to show that all EVA's can be performed under 6 hours.
These times range from about 1.8 hours as a low to just under 6 hours for
maximum EVA time. The majority of EVA's, 62 percent will be less than 2.7
hours. A more questionable area is that of contingency EVA.
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Figure 3-24. EVA Operating Hours Per Egress vs. Cum Percent
Contingency activity is, without a doubt, the most difficult to assess.
By definition 'a continency is -a failure mode which, if not checked or corrected,
may degrade or preclude mission success. There are little or no data available
pertaining to any contingency analyses on the presently planned missions. Two
`pertinent sources are a Planning Research Corporation report l -and the Skylab
program. Some typical anomalies taken from the above referenced sources which
are applicable to Shuttle missions are:
i
Fluid ;system leakage
Contamination cover partial: ".eployment
Erection mechanism jamming
Unclean separation	 i
3
1Reliability Data from In,-Flight Spacecraft, 1958-"1970, PRC R-1453, dated
November '30,'1971.
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Umbilical separation failure
Lack of positive indication of a function
Stem device failure
TV camera control loss
Appendage deployment failure
Stuck valves and motor drives
Repair time for these ,failures now becomes dependent upon the criticality
of the failure, the extent to which a repair will be attempted, and the ability
to get to the failure. With regard tocriticality of the failure, the astro-
naut can attempt to repair a payload, neutralize it for return to ground, or
assist in jettisoning it. The _attempt to repair will depend upon the philosophy
of on-orbit maintenance/repair.
Consumption of time most likely will be dependent upon the ability of the
	
l	 astronaut to get to the failure. Where substantial disassembly is required to	 il
get to a minor failure, it may require far more total (continuous) suit time
then past experience has shown. Actual Skylab data show that 27 mission objec-
tive tasks and 12 in-flight repair tasks were added to the previously planned
EVA operations. Table 3-18 lists these tasks and their actual elapsed times.
All of these times are within the projected 6-hour capability; however, it can	 t
be postulated that in the interest of economics in the Shuttle era, it would 	 l
be most desirable to effect all repairs to a deployed spacecraft on one launch
and preclude the cost of a second Shuttle flight. Thus, for the failure effects
of the Skylab launch, if a subsequent Shuttle flight were to have an EVA repair
activity added to it, both the solar array deployment and thermal protective
cover tasks would be required. While this activity could be _performed on more
than one day, it would be more attractive if the demands on the orbiter time
could be minimized so as to allow it to completep	 previously scheduled activities.
In this case, the two task times could add ,up to >6 hours of EVA.
This is a very subjective area and dependent upon the payload design.
Consequently, this requirement to increase suit operating time beyond 6 to 7
hours per day should be held in abeyance until the payload design, maintenance
and repair philosophies, and more realistic failure mode=s are defined. However,
it is recommended that EMU requirements should consider capability to extend or
add to an EVA to accomplish up to 8 hours by use of kits, recharge, or perhaps
modular exchange of life support units,
	
'	 1
3.3.16 Reliability/Maintainability -- Crew Performance
3
Reliability is defined as the ability of the EMU suit system to adequately -	 1
provide the crewman with the capability of performing his tasks and functions
throughout a required time duration and quantity of functional operations
without deterioration of its operating and support characteristics beyond 	 9
acceptable limits.	 j
In addition to providing the crewman the capability of performing the
tasks of _unlatching the retaining latches and locks, uncovering optics and
sensors, and erecting booms and antennas, the EMU suit must possess the 'reliability
to provide the crewman with the support and capability to retract all the
applicable booms and antennas, and relatch all latches and Locks, and cover all
optics and sensors that were initially uncovered.
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The EMU suit must also provide the availability of the crewman to overrides
stow/jettison, any automated mechanism or operation which incorporates an EMU
performance requirement.. The reliability of the EVA system must be equal to
the reliability of the automated system it is designed to replace.
Maintainability is defined as the ability or characteristics of the EMU
suit to be maintained in a satisfactory condition to continue its required
crewman support capability. The design and construction of the EMU suit and
its components shall ensure ease and rapidity of repair and maintenance in the
field and during mission use. The design shall be such that the use of special
tools shall be minimized for normal maintenance and checkout of the EMU.
3.3.17 Contamination - Payload Protection
Contamination in this instance equates to the contribution or production
of foreign materials (gases, liquids, solids, and particulates) through the
processes of leakage, venting, and out-gassing of the EMU. Contamination sources
and levels identified for the A7L suit are identified in Figure 3-25. They
are shown as representative of existing state-of-the-art suit contamination
characteristics, including particulates, water vapor, and gases. Payload
requirements relative to these contaminants are discussed below,
CURRENT TECHNOLOGY (A7L)
• PARTICLES (DUST, LENT, METAL)
0.5 - 500 MICRONS
	 SUIT LEAKAGE	 H202
GASES
• H2O VAPOR	 RGANICSR
1.72 LB/HR (0.22 9m/SEC)
• GASES, LEAKAGE	 i
0.01634 LB/HR (0.0022 gm/SEC)
• ORGANICS (TRACE GASES)
9.5 x 10 6 LB/HR (11 x 10 7 gm/SEC)
PARTICLES	 -
LINT
CONTROL TECHNIQUES/ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
• REAR DIRECTED H2O VENTING
	 1
• COVER GARMENT - LEAKAGE PROTECTION
• H I-AT SINK NO H2O SUBLIMATION
	
7
•'-02 REGENERATIVE SYSTEM - LOW GAS VENTING
,
Figure 3-25. Contamination Sources -'EVA Equipment
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3.3.17.1_ Particulate Requirements
i
i
	
	
Payloads utilizing optics to accomplish their objectives are sensitive to
contaminants which could collect on the lens surfaces. Payloads which have
been designed to measure space environment would be adversely affected by
artificial contamination. Table 3-19 indicates the specified cleanliness
i	 levels of the study representative payloads.
Table 3-19. Cleanliness Levels for Representative Payloads
Payload
Cleanliness Levels
Oper. External Non-Oiler. External
a.	 MMS, 10,000 10,000
b.	 ST 1,000 10,000
c.	 ATL 100,000 10010000
d._	 AMPS 100,000 100,000 (unpress)`
e.	 MJ0 1,000 1,000
f.	 SIRTF 1,000 5,000
g.	 ASP 1,000	 - 5,000
i
7
The following Table 3-20 identifies the applicable cleanliness classes
and allowable numbers and particle sizes in microns relative to the above
r	 identified cleanliness levels,.
Table 3-20. Cleanliness Classes Definition
Class
Allowable Number & Size of 'Particles
0.5 Microns & Larger 5.0 Microns & Larger
1,000 1,000 Not applicable
5,000 5,000 30
10,000 10,000 65
100,000 100,000 700
n
l
(
	
	
Astronomical payloads are particularly sensitive in terms of `'artificial
stars” or small particles. For sortie astronomy payloads the contamination
cloud is definedl as requiring particle sizes less than %10u for IR telescopes
or 0.lp for UV or optical spectra.
f
j	 1"Astronomy Working Group Recommended Contamination Limits for Astronomy Sortie	 {
Missions", GDCA-DDA-73-009, dated 11 June 1973, revised 31 October, 1973,
Prepared by Convair Aerospace Division of General Dynamics, ContractI	
NA88-29462.
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3.3.17.2 Condensation
Condensation is required not to cause one percent or greater absorption
of radiation. Ice particles of lu size must be less than 10- 2 gm/sec (0.08
lb/hr). An analysis made of IR cooled telescopes by Dr. F. Witteborn of-ARC1
is quoted as follows:
"A rough estimate can be made of the amount of water that will condense
onto the mirror of the cooled (20°K) infrared telescope during an EVA by
`	 considering the spacesuit as a point source of water molecules at a distance
of 1 meter from the front of the telescope. The source strength (water molecule
discharge rate) is 1.72 lb/hour (7.2 x 1021 molecules/sec). The telescope is
assumed to be ,4 meters long from entrance to primary mirror, so that the mirror
j„
	
	
is 5 meters from the source. A sticking coefficient of unity is assumed through-
out, so that the fraction of molecules absorbed by the mirror is determined only
its solid angle. 1.8
.1 micron layerisbu 10
iltup9 molecules
 e	
strike
	 r	 sin 	 2minutes. A 0.1 microna 0	 raises	 a
the emissivity in the IR by 0.01 (with modest wavelength dependence)which is
j'	 the total allowed for the entire mission without noticeable degradation of
perf orman ce,
"The actual geometry is improved by the fact that the water sublimator is
on the astronaut's back which would be pointed away from the telescope if he
were to work near the entrance aperture.' Of course, he must not turn his back,
towards the entrance aperture unless its door is closed. It is also clear that
any work he does near the entrance aperture must be accomplished in less than
`	 2 minutes unless some other protective device is used inside the telescope
"The above discussion did not take account of the degradation of the cold
baffles near the entrance aperture of the telescope. These would accumulate
deposits nearly 25 times as fast as the primary mirror. Deposits on the baffles
might degrade their off-axis rejection capabilities Of even greater concern
is the responsibility that dust from the EVA suit would stick to the baffles or
mirror surface. Again the off-axis rejection would suffer resulting in more
background noise:
''It may be necessary to continually purge the telescope barrel with a
non-condensable gas such as helium in order to prevent condensation of ambient 	 I
atmospheric gases (e-.g., atomic oxygen, nitrogen)
	
Sufficient pressure would
be maintained to provide a mean free path for collisions of 10 to 50 cm. This
purge gas would also provide protection against the water vapor released by
the EVA suit.
"The use of an EVA near an unprotected IR telescope is certainly not
expected in its normal operation. The use of a molecular-water-venting sub
limator during such an EVA does not appear to present insurmountable problems.
This conclusion' does not hold if the water is vented in liquid or crystalline
form."
a
<i
1NASA-ARC Internal Latter SSA246--6, dated 1/11/74 to Dr. Lubert Leger (ES5),
JSC'from Dr. F. Witteborn. Subject; Contamination of Cooled Telescope
Mirror by Water From EVA Suit Sublimator.
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3.3.17.3	 Column Density - Contaminant Cloud
Astronomy payloads re wire that absorption lines be optically thin with
gas densities less than 10 2 /cm2 .	 The EMU, as defined above, would be a
negligible contributor.
3.3.18	 EMI/EMC -Payload Protection
Electromagnetic interference (EMI) is the interference caused by the
electromagnetic fields generated by the operation of electronic units or the
transmission of electrical or signal energy which causes conflict to another
electronic system/subsystem which is operating in close proximity.
A system can be either EMI radiating (radiating EMI through its operation
which can cause interference with another electronic system) or EMI susceptible
(itself being affected by the EMI generated by another electronic system),
All electrical systems of the EMU must comply with Specification SL-E-0001
(which is a special adaptation of-MIL-E-60510 for Electromagnetic Compatibility
Requirements for the Systems for the Space Shuttle Program) during all phases
- of the Shuttle mission. 	 The EMU electrical systems will be designed to meet
the requirements of Specification SL-E-0002 (which is a special adaptation of
MIL-STD-461A for Electromagnetic Interference Characteristics Requirements for
Equipment for the Space Shuttle Program).
	
However, these requirements are not
necessarily compatible with payload designs.
	
The Spacelab ICD requirements
reflect both the JSC SL-E-0002 specification and MIL-B-5087B, as well as an
extensive listing of unique requirements which may or may not be compatible with 	 j
the EMU.	 A typical DoD spacecraft (CPS) ,specifies five MIL standards or docu-
ments, plus two SAMSO documents--all with their own unique requirements.
	 A
more thorough review of allpotential payload EMI/EMC
	 requirements is essential
to ensure payload, orbiter, EMU compatibility.
Items of concern for possible EMI causes: of degradation to the EMU suit
EKG telemetry capability are:,
a.	 Solenoids
b_.	 Circuit breakers
c.	 Motors
d.	 Motor--driven latches	 7
e.	 Transmitters
3.3.19	 Dielectric Properties - Payload Protection
The use of the term dielectric property here is defined as in paragraph
rI 3.3.4; i.e., the electrical property of material which in the event of physical
contact with energized conductors has a resultant transmissibility character-
t
istic of infinite resistance. i
Electrical systems in the orbiter, the Spacelab, and free-flying space-
craft requiring crew interface during normal and contingency operations can
be damaged if the EMU should come into contact with connectors, switches, and
circuit breakers as during some unscheduled repair. 	 Concern for payload
equipment as well as for the crewman indicates that the same requirements
} apply as described in paragraph 3.3.4.
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3.3.20 Surface Damage- Payload Protection
In performing various payload-related tasks, the EVA crewman is a potential
source of damage to various payload elements. Various factors may influence
this potential,_ such as visibility, discussed previously, which may result in
accidental damage, or force application. A review of payload_ characteristics
and discussions with the payload community indicates;
	
	
3j
1. Structural elements are not elements of concern.
I
1
2. Preferred work station attachments, however', should be on
pallet or orbiter structure. 	 I
3. Various thermal coatings are more sensitive, as discussed
below.
No specific data are available on thermal degradation due to handling.
However, as an example of sensitivity, the teflon-coated glass cloth of the
cargo bay liner will degrade from a solar absorptivity (as) of 0.33 to 0.45
	 l
with about 1400 hours of UV exposure only. However, less than 25 percent of
this degradation (as = 0.36) is the maximum allowable.
No clear requirements can be derived relative to the protection of the 	 lpayload. Figure 3-26 illustrates typical sensitive elements on the payload]
including thermal coatings and solar panels.
The following generalized requirements should be considered in the design
and fabrication of the EMU. 	 3
1. Ensure crewman mobility to maneuver about payload areas.
2. Provide visibility in the direction of crew movement at
all times.
3. Minimize bulk in non-visible EMU equipment areas
4. Pad, or otherwise protect hard elements of the EMU. ,i
Of particular concernare various payload thermal coatings. Damage to
the thermal protection can degrade the thermal properties of the spacecraft
thus affecting its performance. Typical finishes of concern are:
1. Z93 paint - chips easily, absorbs oils, 1.3 E-06 to 1.9 E-06 meters
_(50 to 70 millionths of one inch) degrades reflectance
2. S13G paint fairly rugged but can be cut, can become soiled
but is washable
3. Aluminized thin coatings - subject to removal by abrasion
i
4. Reinforced kapton - is tear resistant but can be damaged.
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5. Teflon coated glass cloth - can be ripped
6. Silver-coated teflon reflectance_ degrades quickly with
surface damage
SILVER COATED TEFLON' (E 0. 7, as - 0. 07, as/e _ 0.1)
S13G PAINT (	 0. 88, as 0.23, as /e s 0.26)
{
G
i
i
SOLAR PANEL
l	 ^	 r
r I
(e= 0.78,
i	 as = 0.73,	 9	 0
as /e a 0.94)	 c	
-	
I
t
(	 REF: SPACE TELESCOPE
HIGH MUSSIVITY PAINT _	 SUPPORT SYSTEM MODULE
(INTERNAL SURFACES)	 FIRST'DESI= REVIEW 3(MARTINJMMETTA & IBM)'
1
Figure 3-26. Typical Spacecraft Thermal Finishes
1
;
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j
5
5
y
3-56
SD 76-SA-0026
01% Rockwell Intemational_ Space Divsioe
SECTION IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
AND EVALUATION OF REQUIREMENTS AREAS
Throughout the study, effort was concentrated on (1) deriving EMU require-
ments on the basis of payload-to-EVA interfaces, (2) comparing requirements
identified with previous or on-going EMU capabilities, emphasizing those with
potential advanced technology development, and (3) making recommendations which
are quantitative if possible, or qualitative, which reflect identified deficiencies
of current EMU's to meet payload requirements.
4.1 SUMMARY OF RECO^RTENDATIONS
i
In addition to the detailed results appropriate to each requirement area,
a recommendation was considered as to appropriate disposition. Seven categories
i	 of disposition were defined as follows.
1. Standard design and development--for those requirements where
data developed in the study should be sufficient for a designer,
using standard practices, to accomplish a design solution.
E s
2. Standard human engineering and physiological requirements--for
those cases involving further interpretation, of requirements to
ensure that design solutions are appropriate to the crewman. 	 J
3. Lab testing required--some requirements could not quantified
with study resources, some requirements could only be quantified
as to the interface--not as to processess or materials to meet
a requirement. For these requirements,: laboratory testing
programs are recommended.
-	 4. Further study recommended--the probable disposition in some cases
is for more ;in-depth study to be conducted, either in conjunction
with or preceeding additional test/development activities, thus
ensuring proper direction to the more costly DDT&E activities.
5. Technology development required--this group identifies those
cases where state-of-the-art advancement is warranted to meet A
requirements areas.
6. Performance simulations recommended--for those requirement areas,
primarily those which were subjective or based on estimates highly
dependent on assumptions, where neutral buoyancy or Keplerian
trajectory simulations are necessary to obtain precise quantitative
data.
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7. STS documentation /specification compatiblity--In a few cases,
EMU requirements may be driven by STS documentation. It is not
now clear, in many cases, whether the EMU should meet STS
subsystem specifications or whether it should be treated as a
payload in meeting STS requirements, nor even what these are.
Possible areas of omission in this respect are identified.
Ten of the 20 requirements areas should be able to be resolved by application
only of standard design practices, or with supplementary testing, standard
life sciences inputs ., or STS document requirements. The radiation requirement
area requires a developmental study to consider physiological dose rates from
all sources and which reflect crew flight schedules. In addition, lab testing_
and technology status of EMU protective materials are required. Four require-
meuts need simulations in neutral buoyancy or zero-g in conjunction with other
design or test activities to develop quantitative requirements data. In at least
one case, bio-contamination, laboratory testing may define or rule out require-
ments for the EMU.
The requirements relative to reaction time appear to require (1) laboratory
testing of 00-psi suits for 'mobility and performance characteristics, (2) a cost
effectiveness study, and (3) a'review for compatibility with the STS. Mobility
and contamination areas require lab test data and continuing technology develop-
ment. Finally, the reliability requirements need an in-depth reliability analysis
and application of reliability design principles.	 a
Table 4-1 summarizes_ these study recommendations,
Table 4-1. Requirement Type Recommendations Summary
Requirement Area
Standard
Design
Develon-
ment
Standard
Human
Eng'r &
Physio—
logical
Regm:'ts.
Lab
Testing
Recom—
mended
Further
Study
Recom-
mended
Technology
Develop-
ment
Req'd.
Performance
Simulations
Recommended
STS
Document/
Compatibil-
ity
Crew Protection
Flammability X
Thermal X X X
Durability R X X
Dielectric Prop. X X X
Radiation Resistance X X X
Penetration/Abrasion X X X X
Fluid Resistance X X
Impact Resistance X X X
Bio Contamination X
Crew Performance
Reaction Time X X X X
Force Interfaces X X X
Mobility X _X
Visibility/Orientation X X X
Communication' X X
Operating Time X X
Reliability/Maintenance X X-
Payload Protection'
X XContamination
EMI / IMC X { X
Dielectric Properties X X
Surface Damage X X
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4.2 REQUIREMENTS REVIEW
The requirements areas were analyzed on the basis of a potentially full
range of payload characteristics, mission operations, and EVA tasks. That is,
planned operations, including on-orbit maintenance, and for response to payload
failures (contingencies). The evaluation assumed that the crewman might inter-
	
I`	 face with payloads with various systems operating and could include exposure to
	
I°	 potential hazards. For example, the EVA crewman could operate in the vicinity
of the orbiter Ku-band rendezvous radar or various payload RF sources. The
crewman_ could be performing disconnect operations or servicing for various pay-
load fluid systems. The EVA astronaut may be performing trouble-shooting or
repair of electrical equipment requiring power-on situations (as was accomplished
on Skylab). Such interfaces are defined as hazardous and are considered, as in
ground operations, to be normal interfaces recognizing the higher risk. Not
considered in the study are payload failure modes or accidents such as premature
detonation of pyrotechnics,, motor firings, high pressure system explosions,>
failed mechanical devices or similar modes.
i
4.2.1 Flammability
The review of payload characteristics and flammability criteria indicate
G
	
	
that the EMU will not be susceptible to external sources of ignition. In order
to maintain flame propagation there must be a flame supporting oxidizer and a
3
surrounding pressure. Therefore, should the EMU be engulfed in an oxidizer, the
lack of-a . surrounding pressure at the Shuttle orbiter altitude will not support	 a
combustion., The critical area of concern is within the EMU itself. Any EMU
electrical system, must be designed and built such as not to become the ignition
source internally to the EMU or the portable life support system. Since this is
not a payload-derived
 requirement, no further analysis was conducted. Standard
flammability design practices should meet any requirements.
	
w	 4.2.2 Thermal
F
Various EVA tasks were evaluated for potential thermal interfacing with the
baseline payloads. The maximum values for the majority of tasks range from 128°K
(-230°F) on the low side, to 483°K (410°F) on the high side. By taking the mean
and standard deviation for the task-temperatures, it was concluded that 144°K
(-200 0 F) to 394°K (250'F) are the appropriate design-to range for natural environ-
ment. Functional temperatures will fall within _a smaller range, except for fin
temperatures of RTG's. For this case, 522°K (480°F) and for natural extremes, it
is recommended that separate protection be applied for the few instances it is
required. Follow-on *recommendations indicate application of standard design and
physiological principles as well as laboratory testing of thermal protective
characteristics of candidate glove materials and thicknesses at these interface
temperatures.	 5
4.2.3 Durability
Evaluation of EVA tasks indicate, that flexing of the EMU occurs primarily at
the waist and shoulders and in the hand, wrist, and arm areas. Waist mobility is
highly, desirable to allow the astronaut to see around blocked areas during EVA.
The _waist_must be substantially designed to withstand continual flexing in this.
4
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Based on estimates of EVA tasks extrapolated to the traffic model payloads,
flexing cycles range from 16 to over 200 thousand cycles. Although current life
cycle capability could not be determined, Apollo/Skylab "soft suits" tended to
indicate early wearout characteristics. It is recommended that task simulations
be conducted to establish empirical data, followed up with lab testing of the
effects on various materials.
4..2.4 Dielectric Properties
EMU materials and construction must be non-conductive so as not to be pain-
ful nor injurious to EVA crewmen, damaging to payload components, and so as to
prevent static potential during payload operations. Although Skylab EVA'
included unscheduled repairs during power-on situations, no data were available
regarding possible EMU conductivity. It should be clear, however, that the scope
of orbiter payloads may increase the potential hazard to crew and to payload
components. Laboratory testing of materials and identification of EMU properties
in STS documentation are recommended.
4.2.5 Radiation Resistance
During EVA exposure to RTG's, the crewman would receive about 1/4 to 1/2
the allowable daily dose. Since only about 20 payload deliveries in the payload
model for 1980 through 1991 would be likely to utilize the RTG, there does not	 {
appear to be a basic design requirement. However, since contingency operations
may be required, special purpose protective over gloves could be a consideration.
f:
The daily dose from 'Van Allen sources during one six-hour EVA period in the
worst orbits could equal 30 rads, about 1,/3 the 30-day _allowable radiation assuming
0.3 gm/em2 shielding equivalent from the EMU. Although study data indicate that -
EVA's typically would average about 3.1 hours, conservative design should probably
anticipate 6-hour EVA's. Also, statistical estimates indicate an average of 1.8
EVA's,per mission. Technology research is recommended to determine EMU shielding
capabilities, and to perform further analyses of the required protection so as
not toexceed allowable dose limits if routine EVA is to be allowed.
Indications are that the equivalent of 0.4 to 0.45 gm/cm2 would be desirable
for routinely available EVA. Technology investigation of suitable materials with
satisfactory mobility characteristics is recommended. A study of Shuttle astro-
naut'career activities may also be required, as well as physiological inputs as to
their other radiation exposures from space and atmospheric flights.
4.2.6 Penetration, Abrasion
i
With hundreds of spacecraft and sortie experiments being planned or developed,
it appears reasonable to ensure; EMU protection against various spacecraft design
criteria. Manned and unmanned spacecraft standards suggest that EMU designs should
tolerate at least a 0.038 cm (0.015 inch) radius as being the sharpest identified.
While random burrs or screw heads are more difficult to define, laboratory {.nvesti 
gation of material resistance is indicated. Although it would appear that pro-
tecting the EMU would be cheaper than requiring extensive radiussing,of all pay-
load edges, a cost trade may be warranted:
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4.2.7	 Fluid Resistance
Crew activities in support of ^he various payloads will require development
and testing of suit materials under exposure to diverse elements such as cryo-
genics, hydrazine, and other propellants to establish the selection of the required
suit materials.
4.2.8	 Impact Resistance
Estimates are that crew translation rates could be in the order of 1 to 1.5
meters per second 0,3 to u 5	 feet per second).	 Considering the mass of the suited
crewman, forces in the order of 2224 N (500 lb) could be expected. 	 If an exposed
corner were encountered, with a radius of about 0.64 cm (0.25 in.), the pressure
could reach 5500 N/cm2 (8000 psi).
It is recommended that lab testing be conducted to determine the extent of
damage especial"'y to areas of the EMU such as the helmet alid backpack which are
hard surfaces and where the crewman's viewing may be impaired. 	 Underwater simula-
tions may be important to develop techniques for pushing off and for evaluating
capability of the crewman to push off.	 It should also be noted that sharper
radii may be encountered--see paragraph 3.2.6 above.
4.2.9	 Bio-Contamination
Although various payloads carry organic specimens, the actual amount of
biological contamination is difficult to predict due to the unknown types and
quantity that might adhere to the EMU.	 Further research and laboratory tests
appear to be in order to determine viability of various organisms in a vacuum
and any necessary control techniques.
4.2.10	 Crew Reaction Time
Result of previous studies indicate that operation at 8 psia will improve
operations and that substantial cost savings could be attributed to quick reaction;
e.g., inc reased experiment time in an EVA mode.	 The 8 psi suit offers the greatest
potential for improved reaction time by elimination of prebreathing. 	 Current
technology developments for a 55 x 103 N/m2 (8 psi) system are projected to equal
or exceed mobility capability of previous technology 34 x 103 N/m2 (5 psi) systems.
Other considerations include technology risk and development costs compared to the
baseline Shuttle EMU.	 Comparative cost analyses are required for 8 psi qualifica-
tion versus cost benefits from reduced EVA response time.	 Continuing technology
development is recommended as well as lab testing of characteristics of the higher
pressure suit.
4.2.11 External Interface
Based on evaluation of EVA tasks, the crewman will frequently be required
to react forces from various segments of the EMU.	 Primary interfaces for this
force reaction will be gloves, front of waist^ top and bottom of boots, front and
back of lower leg, front and back of knees,and shoulders. 	 Value of the applied
force will range from about 110 to 200 Newtons (25 to 45 pounds).	 Simulations
to validate where forces are reacted an d lab tests of EMU materials (especially
thermal/meteoroid garments) is recommended.
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4.2.12 Mobility
The importance of EMU mobility in terms of range of motion have been
recognized in recent EMU developments. Both the current Shuttle EMU procurement
and the Ames suit development activities recognize the importance of these factors
in performing a variety of tasks and reducing crewman fatigue. No delta require-
ment was found in this study. Continued technology and lab testing are recommended
to maximize mobility with minimum torque.
4.2.13 Visibility/Orientation
Optical characteristics of the helmet have been thoroughly analyzed and do
not present a problem. However, two payload interface problems were identified.
It was concluded that the crewman has little or no visibility of the backpack
assembly, and must rely on a sense of its bulk. Supporting research should be
employed to determine the scope of the problem and potential design solutions
such as "cat whiskers" or relocation of life support components to more visible
areas. It is recommended that simulations be conducted in a backpack mode, and,
if orientation problems are encountered, that life support component packaging
design and location (e.g., to front or side areas) be investigated. In addition,
reflectance characteristics of 85 to 95 percent of various payload surfaces
indicates potential visor design requirements.
4.2.14 Communications
Voice communications will be mandatory during EVA periods. During certain
periods such as spacecraft rendezvous and docking and for various payload opera
tions, some communications interference may be encountered, unless special pre-
cautions are taken. These precautions include the insertion of appropriate true -
trap filters' to absorb undesirable RF energy which may be generated from such
sources as the rendezvous radar or scientific RF generating equipment. In addition,
special shielding may also be required for the EMU amplifier circuits for suppression
i of other spurious signals It could not be confirmed that these requirements are
currently imposed on Extravehicular Communications System (EVCS) design.
	
}d
4.2.15 Operations Time
i
A statistical summary of mission EVA durations was compiled, based on the 	 a
`'EVA" study. The data show that all EVA's can be performed in less than 6 hours.j
Durations range from about 1.8 hours to just under 6 hours. The majority of EVA's
<62 percent, require less than 2.7 hours. A more uncertain area is that of
contingency EVA; however, Skylab data show that of three major and several minor
contingency repairs performed EVA, none exceeded 4 hours However, further study,
especially in advanced solar power station support concepts or on the basis of
Shuttle/payload failure modes and effects may indicate the requirement to increase
suit operating time beyond 6 to 7 hours per day. It is recommended that EMU
requirements consider capbaility to extend or add to an EVA to accomplish up to
8 hours by use of kits, recharge, or perhaps modular exchange of life support
units. Life support units sized at 4 hours could perform most EVA's, but could	 a
then extend EVA's easily with beneficial effects on backpack size.
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4.2.16 Reliability /Maintainability
The EMU system must possess the reliability to provide the crewman with the
capability to retract/safety all the applicable booms, antennas, latches, locks,
and cover all optics and sensors that were designed for EVA. The EMU system must
also ensure availability of the crewman to override any automated mechanism or
operation which incorporates an EVA performance requirement. Current design goals 	 r
have only identified crew safety as a reliability requirement. Reliability of
crew response for payload manual designs should also be added as a design goal.
A reliability analysis of EVA response is recommended. The 'reliability of the
EVA system must in all cases be equal to the reliability of the automated system
it is designed to replace.
i
4.2.17 Contamination
Primary concerns are particulates and water vapor. Since particulate
adherence to optics elements in zero-g is not likely, reasonable care should
be adequate. A possible design objective for materials could be to ensure that
particulate diameters be <5.0 microns. Condensate control has been frequently,
studied. Solutions involving directional control appears to be adequate at
present (i.e., rearward venting only). However, advanced development is
I	 recommended which could include positive containment with remote venting or
{ perhaps closed systems.
4.2.18 EMI/EMC
Electrical systems of the EMU must comply with Specification SL-E-0001
(Electromagnetic Compatibility Requirements for the Systems for the Space Shuttle
Program) during all phases of the Shuttle mission as specified in the EMU RFP
and Specification SL-E-002 (Electromagnetic Interface Characteristics Require-
ments for Equipment for the Space Shuttle Program). Since EMI/EMC requirements
for payloads have not been specified, further review and monitoring of STS
documentation are required to ensure EMU compatibility with payloads.
4.2.19 Dielectric Properties i
Considerations and recommendations are the same as for paragraph 3.2.4.
4.2 ;20 Surface Damage
In general, payload structured areas are not easily subject to damage by the
EMU suitedcrewman. However, various areas of thermal<coatings -and fragile-ele-
ments such as solar cells can be easily damaged: Since all factors of EVA inter-
face cannot be specified, only_, general design requirements can be established
These include: improved mobility to maneuver about the payload, ,clear viewing
of translation path, reduction of backpack volume (since this region cannot be
seen by the crewman), padding of hard elements of the EMU, and minimal` abrasive
characteristics of the EMU gloves.` Neutral buoyancy or other simulations of
crew body handling plus lab testing of damage characteristics are recommended.
I
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